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Our moral evaluations of an act are influenced by factors ranging from whether 
we’ve recently washed our hands to whether we’ve just heard a funny joke.  A flurry of 
recent work in empirical moral psychology has focused on cataloguing these influences, 
but identifying them and understanding the circumstances under which they operate gives 
us only half the story.  We intuitively recognize some causes of judgments or choices as 
arbitrary and irrelevant; if I decide to donate to a specific charity by flipping a coin, or by 
picking its name out of a hat, then arguably I’ve failed to make a judgment at all.  
Instead, I’ve let an external factor— one that’s completely unrelated to the relevant 
features of the case— determine my action for me.  On the other hand, if I choose to give 
to a charity that buys antiretroviral drugs to treat HIV and sends them to Africa rather 
than a charity that buys suits for laid-off stock brokers, I’ve made a decision based on my 
assessments of need, suffering, and perhaps desert.  The territory between these two 
extremes is what this dissertation sets out to explore: how do we assess whether a given 
factor is distorting, rather than informing, a normative judgment?  How much 
divergence— in both the content of judgments and the causes of those judgments— can a 
single metaethical theory accommodate? 
The three papers in this volume stem can be read as an attempt to illustrate how 
empirical inquiry into the nature of moral judgment informs and constrains metaethical 
theorizing.  In Chapter One, ‘The Good and the Gross,’ I argue that the ubiquity of 
affective and metacognitive influences on judgment means that a straightforward 
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skeptical argument from the influence of disgust on moral judgment is untenable, as it 
threatens to result in global evaluative skepticism.  In Chapter Two, ‘How Moral 
Disagreement is a Problem for Realism,’ I show why the argument(s) from moral 
disagreement depend on facts about the actual extent and nature of moral disagreement, 
and argue that these facts create problems for moral realism.  In Chapter Three I show 
that there is no straightforward answer to the question, ‘does moral discourse presuppose 
objectivity?’  Rather, the answer is, ‘it depends.’  This is because empirical research has 
revealed that judgments of moral objectivity vary depending on the content of the claim 
under consideration.  But this does not mean that moral discourse is metaethically 
variable, inconsistent, or incoherent: a relativist analysis of moral claims can explain and 
accommodate this variation in objectivity.   
The implications of the arguments presented in Chapter One extend far beyond 
disgust.  I have chosen to focus on disgust here both because its involvement in moral 
judgment has recently become the focus of a flurry of empirical research, and because it 
presents a particularly challenging case.  Disgust’s track record as an influence on 
policies and behaviors is mixed at best: it is often recruited to motivate exclusion and 
ostracism, and to paint certain ethnic or religious groups as unclean or polluting. This 
checkered past, taken in conjunction with disgust’s origins as a guard against 
contamination by parasites and poisons, makes disgust a particularly tempting target for a 
skeptical argument.  In fact, however, this line of thought conflates first-order normative 
considerations with second-order questions about the appropriateness of certain emotions 
or affective states as inputs to (or constituents of) evaluative judgments.  The fact that 
disgust can be used to motivate morally reprehensible behaviors or attitudes doesn’t show 
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that it is itself a mistake; in fact, I argue, disgust may function, in the socio-moral 
domain, to alert us to the threat of social contamination.  But this means that determining 
when disgust is an appropriate response to some act or attitude is inextricably bound up 
with the normative status of the act or attitude under consideration, just as determining 
when some substance is potentially deleterious to our physical health requires an 
antecedent conception of physical health.  The reason this is particularly vexing in the 
moral case is that it is precisely the intuitions whose legitimacy is under consideration 
which inform our judgments about the normative status of those same actions and 
attitudes whose status we need to determine before we can decide whether the affective 
response that informs our intuition is appropriate or whether it’s mistaken or out of place.  
In the case of normative judgments, we are reliant on intuition to produce the very 
yardstick against which we assess the accuracy of intuition. 
 I’ve attempted to circumvent this problem by focusing on the characteristic ways 
that disgust presents its objects, and this approach suggests that disgust is not uniformly 
out of place in moral and other evaluative judgments.  But adopting this approach means 
that talk of whether affect or emotion ‘distorts’ or ‘biases’ evaluative judgment is a gross 
oversimplification.  Instead, we’ll have to adopt a case-by-case approach to the question 
of how and why various emotions or types of affect do or do not have a legitimate role to 
play in our evaluative appraisals.   
 This complication is not, I argue, specific to affect or emotion.  Much like ‘affect’ 
and ‘emotion,’ the terms ‘framing effect,’ ‘heuristic,’ and ‘bias’ pick out a wide variety 
of phenomena.  The fact that these latter terms are often used pejoratively reflects 
confusion between the first-order judgments that result from their application and the 
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phenomena themselves.  And if affective influences are ubiquitous, framing effects are 
positively inescapable.  For example, the order in which a cafeteria presents foods has a 
significant impact on which foods people choose.  But there is no frame-independent 
presentation here against which we can measure various alternatives: the foods must be 
presented in some manner or another.  Framing effects occur when a choice is affected by 
inconsequential features of the formulation or presentation of the options.  But which 
features are consequential is itself a normative question, and as such, may not be subject 
to investigation from a frame-neutral standpoint.  What we can do is reach a decision 
about what outcomes are desirable and choose frames and heuristics that promote that 
outcome.  But we must be aware that the intuitions we rely on to reach that decision will 
themselves be influenced by affect, heuristics, and framing effects.   
 This observation has implications that extend well beyond theories of moral 
judgment.  Advocates of paternalism might draw on arguments like the one above to 
justify policies that ‘nudge’ (to borrow a term from the legal scholar Cass Sunstein) 
people towards one decision rather than another: if the food has to be presented in some 
order or another, the thought goes, and if that order is going to influence people’s 
choices, then this presents us with an opportunity to help people make better choices.  Of 
course, cake is not killing, and which foods are healthiest is a far less controversial matter 
than which lives are most valuable, even among the supposed experts. 
 A similar problem arises in the discussion of defusing explanations in chapter 
two.  Here, the relevant question is how to counterfactually characterize the parties 
involved in a moral disagreement so as to evaluate which factors are or aren’t causally 
implicated in the dispute.  This is not a problem involving framing effects, but it is a 
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problem that stems from finding a neutral standpoint from which the two parties can 
conduct their debate.  I’ll argue in chapter two that moral disagreements are often caused 
by disagreements over theories of fairness, or personhood; these theories might be 
thought of as frames of a sort.  While not inconsequential, they exert an influence over 
our evaluations and preferences, and there is often no way of formulating or assessing 
options or preferences independently of them.  And the fact that people disagree over 
which features are consequential or properly granted consideration (is it okay to accord 
oneself or one’s family a greater share of resources?  What if they’re life-saving 
resources?  How serious a wrong is an insult to one’s reputation?) complicates the matter 
of settling moral disagreements: not only are we unable to escape the influence of 
framing on our moral judgments, but we can’t agree on the normative status or 
acceptability of the frames themselves.  To a utilitarian like Peter Singer, giving money to 
a homeless person rather than a child three thousand miles away is no less arbitrary than 
flipping a coin; on the other hand, perhaps one has a greater duty to foster well-being and 
help members of one’s own community.1   
 These considerations might seem unduly skeptical or pessimistic: after all, we can 
surely all agree that it is better to donate money to buy lifesaving medicine than to buy a 
Brooks Brothers suit for a wealthy (and healthy) young man.  I grant the significance of 
this point, and in chapter three I take up the question of whether a metaethical theory can 
countenance the existence of both objective and relative moral claims.   
                                                
1 Singer would likely respond by arguing that utilitarianism is the only real frame-independent moral 
theory, since it relies on reason rather than affect.  I return to this point in chapter one, but notice two 
things: the assessment and measurement of utilities is itself highly susceptible to framing; and arguments 
for the claim that reason yields better results than emotion depend on intuitions that in turn are susceptible 
to framing effects.   
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Thus far I’ve been speaking rather broadly in terms of moral judgments and of 
normative and evaluative judgments.  But the latter category includes judgments about 
the tastiness of food, the attractiveness of landscapes, and the funniness of jokes.  The 
papers presented here raise, but do not settle, the question of what makes a moral 
judgment moral.  That is, what is special or unique about moral judgment; what sets it 
apart from other species of evaluative judgments?  I don’t spend much time defending a 
specific answer to this question in what follows, but the arguments presented here do 
have implications for how we go about answering this question.  If we don’t want to 
abandon talk of moral truth or falsity, then we should be wary of defining morality in 
terms of objectivity and convergence.  Therefore, the arguments from disagreement in 
Chapter Two rule out an account on which moral judgment is distinguished by its 
commitment to the idea that it has universal scope or authority.  In Chapter Three I offer 
an analysis of moral judgment, but the form of this analysis does not necessarily 
distinguish moral judgment from other evaluative judgments (such as aesthetic 
judgment).  I concede that this may strike some people as a weakness, but in fact I think it 
is an advantage.  This is in part because I think that there is fundamental disagreement 
over, and variation in, the proper objects of moral judgment.  So-called ‘purity’ norms— 
those governing food, sex, and hygiene— are one example of a domain whose status as 
moral is often contested, and the possibility of such debate is worth preserving.  A second 
consideration stems from the psychological underpinnings of moral judgment.  The idea 
of a ‘moral grammar’ has become increasingly popular in recent years, and has been 
elaborated and defended by John Mikhail and Gilbert Harman, among others.  But this 
strikes me as implausible, simply because the idea of an innate cognitive architecture 
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dedicated specifically to the acquisition and deployment of moral norms would be 
extremely inefficient.  Humans— and perhaps other animals, such as chimpanzees— 
must recognize and conform to a variety of norms if they are to succeed as social 
creatures, and we’ve evolved the capacity necessary to do so.  But if the capacity to learn 
and to conform to norms is evolutionarily antecedent to the capacity for moral judgment, 
then it’s mysterious why an entirely separate cognitive architecture or module would be 
constructed to subserve moral judgment.  Perhaps, then, it’s more accurate to say that we 
have a normative grammar.   
I consider and reject other attempts to identify a signature pattern or psychological 
kind characteristic of moral judgment in chapter three, so I won’t belabor the point here.  
But an alternative to the approaches described above is to think of the domain of morality 
as distinguished by its concerns.  That is, what makes a judgment specifically moral 
(rather than some other kind of normative judgment) is the subject matter it is concerned 
with.  If we adopt this approach, the next question is: what is the distinctively moral 
subject matter; or, what is the characteristic that makes a norm moral?  At the end of 
chapter three, I suggest that this question presupposes— falsely— that our concept of 
moral can be analyzed in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions.  It may be more 
fruitful to think of morality as a prototype or exemplar concept, in which some violations, 
acts, or decisions are paradigmatic instances of morality, and others are more peripheral.  
Some might be the subject of deep and irresolvable disagreement; disgusting norm 
violations involving incest, or cannibalism, for example.    
By now it should be clear that the papers I present here raise a whole new suite of 
questions.  And as we make progress in understanding moral disagreement, so will our 
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understanding of the significance of disagreements involving disgust-based judgments of 
moral wrongness; likewise, as we improve our understanding of how disgust influences 
moral judgment, we will be better able to understand its normative significance, which 
will in turn enable a more informed assessment of disagreements in which one or both 
parties’ judgment is framed in part by disgust.  As I argue in chapter one, the significance 
of various affective and cognitive frames (and here I am including emotion in the former 
category) will need to be assessed individually, so the papers that follow may be read as 
the first in a series of such examinations.   
This is a particularly exciting time to be engaged in moral psychology; empirical 
research into disgust, moral judgment, and judgments about moral objectivity is 
progressing rapidly.  This is both good news and bad news for philosophers such as 
myself who incorporate these findings into their arguments: it requires that we maintain a 
certain modesty, since empirical work in these areas is really in its infancy (see note 1 in 
chapter one below).  At the same time it means that we are afforded the opportunity to do 
more than speculate a priori about the causes of moral disagreements, or about the nature 
of disgust’s influence on moral judgment, or whether people think of morality as 
objective or not— we have the opportunity to engage with empirical research and 
improve our understanding of the phenomena, and we gain access to a plethora of new 
evidence.  It’s this opportunity I intend to capitalize upon in the papers that follow, and I 
hope that in doing so I can simultaneously provide a useful illustration of how discoveries 




THE GOOD AND THE GROSS 
Introduction 
 In The Anatomy of Disgust, William Miller writes that “Disgust has elicited little 
attention in any of the disciplines that claim an interest in the emotions: psychology, 
philosophy, anthropology” (1997: 5)2.  This is no longer true.  Philosophers, in particular, 
have recently taken an interest in disgust, and with good reason: disgust is strongly 
implicated in moral and other evaluative judgments.  However, the nature and status of 
this involvement remains unsettled.  Does disgust have any legitimate role to play in 
moral discourse?  How much (if any) importance should we accord it when assessing 
moral transgressions, or when engaging in moral deliberation?  And should we be 
skeptical about moral judgments that involve or are justified by appeal to disgust?  The 
answers to these questions, I argue, are not as straightforward as they may seem.  I begin 
by briefly surveying the psychological literature on the origins and nature of disgust, 
focusing on its various elicitors and behavioral outputs.  I then discuss some experimental 
and empirical evidence that motivates suspicion of disgust’s role in moral judgment, 
                                                
2 In a similar vein, Kekes (1992: 431) writes that disgust “has not been much discussed in philosophical 
literature, or, indeed anywhere else.”  I initially found these claims implausible, but a search of the database 
Web of Science shows that prior to 1997, 206 papers were published on the topic of disgust and 72 on the 
topics of emotion and disgust; from 1998-2011, those numbers are 1639 and 778, respectively.  
Philosopher’s Index lists 16 papers on disgust prior to 1997, and 0 on emotion and disgust; from 1998-2011 
those numbers are 14 and 53, respectively. 
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before arguing that finding an argument to substantiate that suspicion is more difficult 
than one might expect.  It is tempting to appeal to the fact that disgust often appears to 
bias and distort moral (and other kinds of) judgments, and to lead to irrational responses, 
as a reason to distrust both disgust itself and the moral evaluations in which it is 
implicated.   But this line of argument threatens to end in a widespread skepticism about 
evaluative judgments.  
 The skeptical arguments I’ll be challenging rest on empirical evidence about the 
nature of disgust: its evolutionary origins; the nature and plasticity of the disgust 
response; disgust’s influence on moral judgment; and the way in which disgust represents 
its elicitors.  Therefore, I spend section one surveying the relevant empirical literature, 
before moving on in section two to discuss whether these empirical findings can support 
skepticism about disgust.  I argue that neither the evolutionary origins nor the plasticity 
of the disgust response are sufficient to reach any normative conclusion about the 
significance of disgust.  I concede that disgust’s influence on moral judgment provides an 
initially plausible basis for skepticism, but go on to demonstrate that the argument 
overgeneralizes, generating widespread skepticism about evaluative judgments.  To avoid 
this unpalatable conclusion, the disgust skeptic might instead adopt an indirect strategy of 
examining the different possible roles disgust might play in moral judgment and 
demonstrating that it is ill-equipped to play any of these roles.  However, in section three, 
I show that this strategy also runs into trouble.  Drawing on the observation that one of 
disgust’s central roles is to protect against contamination, I argue that disgust as a 




1. Disgust: a Description 
Disgust is one of the basic emotions, and it is present in all cultures (Rozin et al, 
2000).  It appears that disgust, like language, requires cultural input; there is some 
evidence that feral children do not develop disgust (Miller, 1997: 12-13).  Psychologists 
(see, e.g., Fallon & Rozin, 1983) hypothesize that disgust emerges from the more 
primitive distaste response.  Very young infants and animals will display an aversive 
reaction to bitter substances, a reaction which most likely protects against the ingestion of 
poisonous or harmful substances.  But disgust goes beyond distaste insofar as it need not 
be a response to oral incorporation of an unpleasant taste; it can be elicited through 
multiple sensory modalities.  Disgust also encompasses a global rejection of its object.  
Distaste does not. A flower, for example, might elicit a distaste response if it were put in 
the mouth and found to taste bitter, but this would not entail a rejection of the flower 
itself, just a rejection of the flower qua food.   
 Disgust represents its elicitor as “something revolting, primarily in relation to the 
sense of taste, as actually perceived or vividly imagined; and secondarily to anything 
which causes a similar feeling, through the sense of smell, touch, and even of eyesight” 
(Darwin, cited in Tybur et al, 2009: 103).  The disgust response is characterized by a 
facial expression consisting of a kind of gape in which the labii levator muscles contract 
to raise the upper lips into a grimace.  Other aspects of the response include a withdrawal 
from the elicitor, physiological feelings of nausea, including increased salivation, and 
feelings of revulsion, aversion, offensiveness, and the impression that the object is 
contaminating.  Rozin, Haidt & McCauley (2000: 758) note that “contamination 
sensitivity is a basic feature of disgust.”  Another feature distinguishing disgust from the 
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distaste response is that it endows the offending object with “contamination potency”: if 
something is disgusting, then so is whatever comes into contact with that thing.  If one’s 
hand touches something disgusting, such as feces or vomit, it is contaminated.  If a dead 
body is perceived as disgusting, then a sweater that has been worn by a dead body will 
also be perceived as disgusting.3   
 The recognition of the possibility of contamination by parasites or poison 
presented our ancestors with a “potentially crippling” problem: contaminants are 
typically so small as to be invisible, so our ancestors were forced to confront the fact that 
“everything we might eat or touch is potentially contaminated” and we have no way of 
knowing, in any given case, whether the object is contaminated  (Rozin et al, 2000: 640; 
see also Fallon & Rozin, 1983).  Disgust offers one solution to this problem by 
proscribing certain types of bodily fluids and products, decaying bodies, and foods.  
While humans consume only a small subset of available foods, there is a significant 
difference between foods deemed distasteful and those deemed disgusting—we may 
force ourselves to eat a few bites of a badly overcooked stew out of politeness, but a food 
which truly disgusts us will be hard to choke down and may even cause us to gag, thereby 
expelling it from our mouths, or, in extreme cases, to vomit, thereby expelling it from our 
body.4 
                                                
3 This is one of the features that leads Nussbaum to complain that disgust involves “magical thinking”; see 
also Frazer’s discussion of the laws of contagion and similarity in chapter 3 of The Golden Bough.  I 
discuss this point at length in section 2.4. 
4 This is evident in recent discussions of the viability of insects as a food source—insects are actually ideal 
food in many ways, but their adoption as a food is up against the disgust many people feel when presented 
with the idea.   
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 Disgust may have arisen to protect against literal physical contamination, but it 
also protects against perceived social and spiritual contamination.  Rozin et al (2000) 
describe four types or domains of disgust: core disgust, which protects against 
contamination, and is directed at certain foods, body products or animals; animal 
reminder disgust, which is directed at things that remind us of our animal nature and 
therefore our mortality, such as sex, death, and “body envelope violations” (e.g. a gaping 
wound); interpersonal disgust, which protects the soul and the social order and is directed 
against contact with undesirable others; and moral disgust, which is elicited by moral 
offenses.5     
Empirical studies of disgust suggest three ways it influences moral judgment: by 
amplifying/strengthening moral judgments; as a consequence of appraisals of moral 
wrongness; and by leading to appraisals of moral wrongness even when the actions in 
question are paradigmatically nonmoral (for a more detailed discussion, see Pizarro et al 
in press). 
Several studies have shown that individual sensitivity to disgust correlates with 
both political attitudes and specific moral judgments.  Inbar and Pizarro (2009a) found 
that higher disgust sensitivity correlates with political conservatism.  Highly disgust-
sensitive subjects also judged gay marriage and abortion to be more morally wrong than 
                                                
5 These categories are descriptive and do not attempt to identify what really is or isn’t disgusting, or which 
things or behaviors merit disgust.  Tybur et al (2009) have called into question the utility of Rozin’s four 
categories, proposing instead the categories of “mating, microbes, and morality.”  In section 2.4 below I 
discuss doubts about the claim that reminders of animal nature would be experienced as aversive or as 
linked to mortality.  Animals are worshipped in some societies, such as the indigenous tribes of the Pacific 
Northwest  (for discussion see Levi-Strauss 1966), and Miller disputes the idea that disgust is concerned 
with reminders of death, arguing instead that it is often triggered by “the capacity for life” (1997: 40).  Here 
I am mainly concerned to point out ‘core’ disgust and its typical elicitors, since these will be relevant in 
thinking about disgust’s adaptive function.  I discuss animal disgust and its relationship to mortality in 
greater detail below. 
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their less sensitive counterparts.  In a subsequent study (2009b), the authors report 
finding that disgust sensitivity predicts negative attitudes towards homosexuality. 6  
Again, highly disgust-sensitive subjects evaluated homosexual behavior as more morally 
wrong than their less easily disgusted counterparts.  Schnall et al (2008) found that 
subjects exposed to a disgusting smell judged a variety of moral violations as more wrong 
than did subjects not exposed to the smell.  They also had subjects fill out their surveys at 
either an extremely messy or a clean desk; again, moral judgments were more severe in 
the disgusting condition.  This suggests that the presence of disgust intensifies the moral 
judgment— it’s not that subjects in the nondisgusting conditions didn’t judge the 
transgressions morally wrong, they just judged them less harshly than their disgusted 
counterparts.   
Chapman et al (2009) found that, when subjects playing an ultimatum game were 
presented with unfair offers, they responded with the facial expression characteristic of 
disgust.  Haidt (2001) has argued that moral judgments are affectively laden intuitions, 
which do not result from reasoning but are caused solely by (and therefore are distinct 
from, though a direct result of) our emotional response to the act in question.7  However, 
                                                
6 It should be noted, however, that this study used implicit measures of attitude-- that is, subjects were not 
explicitly queried about their attitudes towards homosexuality; instead, these were inferred from subjects' 
performance on an implicit association test (IAT).  The use of the IAT might be problematic insofar as the 
subject himself is often unaware of the attitude or bias revealed by the IAT-- for example, virtually 
everyone, regardless of race, reveals a bias favoring whites over African-Americans.  Would we therefore 
want to impute this attitude to everyone?   Part of the difficulty here is that there’s often ambiguity over the 
type of attitude we’re interested in (implicit, explicit, consciously accessible or not).  This is a project worth 
pursuing in its own right, though I don’t discuss it here. 
7 As a rule, it is difficult to empirically disentangle the claim that disgust is an affective response to the 
perception that a moral violation has occurred from the claim that disgust just is the moral judgment, since 
the question turns heavily on one’s theory of what a moral judgment is and under what conditions we are 
willing to attribute a judgment to someone (for example, certain sorts of sentimentalists might be happy to 
concede that moral judgment consists in an affective response; others might insist that since a moral 
judgment is a belief, affect is insufficient).  I would like to remain as neutral as possible on the question of 
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some studies have gone beyond documenting that disgust occurs as a consequence of 
moral judgment and attempted to show that disgust suffices to bring about appraisals of 
moral wrongness, even in the absence of any violation that could plausibly be described 
as morally wrong.   
In a striking demonstration of the power of disgust, Wheatley and Haidt 
hypnotized subjects to feel disgust at certain innocuous, affectively neutral words, such as 
'often' and 'take'.  Subjects were then presented with a series of vignettes and asked to rate 
each for wrongness. When the vignette contained the word 'often' or 'take', subjects 
judged it more wrong than when it did not.  Surprisingly, however, this effect persisted 
even when subjects were presented with vignettes containing no moral content 
whatsoever: when given the case of Dan, a student council representative who "often" 
tries to bring interesting speakers to campus or "takes" topics of interest to the other 
students, subjects who had been hypnotized judged Dan's actions morally wrong.  When 
asked, subjects sought to justify this judgment, saying things like, "it just seems like he's 
up to something" and suggesting that Dan might be "a popularity-seeking snob" (2005: 
783).  This suggests that the feeling of disgust is sufficient to bring about an appraisal of 
moral wrongness even in the absence of a moral violation.8   
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
which account of moral judgment is correct; my concern is primarily with whether disgust can be plausibly 
accorded or denied a role in any such theory, and part of what I suggest below is that the difficulties one 
encounters in pursuing this question are not unique to disgust or even to sentimentalist theories of moral 
judgment—they extend to rationalist theories as well.  Hence I try to stick to the less loaded term 
‘appraisal’ when possible.   
8 An objection that immediately presents itself is that disgust triggered by nonmoral objects, such as rotten 
meat, doesn’t result in a moral judgment.  I discuss this point and its significance below. 
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2.  Disgust as Distortion? 
 The descriptive claim is well-established: as the studies above demonstrate, 
disgust is often implicated- as an input to, output of, and/or concomitant with- in moral 
judgment.  But ought we trust it as a guide to moral wrongness?  Does the presence or 
absence of disgust signify anything about the presence or absence of a moral violation?  
If not, then moral judgments based on or involving disgust will, in the absence of 
independent corroboration or justification, be called into question. 
My goal in the next section is not to show how to generate a skeptical argument 
against affect-driven moral judgments—though those looking for a skeptical argument 
for global skepticism about evaluative judgment may find some suggestions below.  
Instead, I want to show how not to generate a skeptical argument against disgust.  (I 
assume throughout what follows that global evaluative skepticism is undesirable and 
something to be avoided if possible.)  Part of my aim is to show how claims about the 
biasing or distorting effects of an emotion must appeal to specific features of the emotion 
in question, and to show why those specific features make it especially likely to distort or 
bias evaluative judgment in problematic ways.  The ubiquity and potency of affective, 
cognitive, and metacognitive influences on moral judgment means that the skeptic can’t 
just gesture at the tendency of these influences to distort judgments and leave it at that, on 
pain of global evaluative skepticism.  Disgust skeptics, I argue below, owe us- but have 
thus far failed to give- a sufficiently detailed and empirically supported basis for 
skepticism about disgust-based moral judgments.  I’ll consider four arguments.  The first 
three appeal to features of disgust’s etiology and its role in moral judgment, and as such, 
fall prey to overgeneralization worries.  The final argument I consider relies on features it 
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claims are specific to disgust.  It therefore has more promise than the first three; 
unfortunately, it fails because the empirical support it requires is lacking. 
 
2.1 Moral Disgust as Auxiliary Disgust   
 One consideration that has been invoked to discredit disgust is the fact that it 
originally evolved to track contamination by poisoning or parasites, and was later “co-
opted” to track moral and social violations.  Its role in moral judgment is therefore an 
auxiliary role, or a byproduct of its original adaptive function.  Byproduct hypotheses 
typically proceed by showing that some trait originally evolved to serve one function and 
later was recruited to serve another; therefore, what appears to be a poor design or 
performance is actually a result of the trait serving a different purpose from the one it 
originally evolved to fulfill.  In the case of disgust, the hypothesis is that it evolved to 
track the threat of physical contamination—which was, in ancestral environments, a real 
and problematic threat, especially in light of the difficulty of detecting contaminants—
and later was recruited to enforce moral and social norms by presenting violations and 
violators as “tainted, contaminating, immoral and somehow less or lower” (Kelly, in 
press: 157).   Because it did not evolve to track them, disgust is somehow mistakenly 
targeted at social and moral violations: “In revealing [moral judgments linked to disgust] 
as byproducts… this view also suggests that these aspects are also baseless” and that 
therefore “this view shows that in these cases, feelings of offensiveness… even when 
vivid, are misplaced” (ibid.) 
 This argument fails because it commits a kind of naturalistic fallacy, by confusing 
the evolutionary purpose or origin of a trait or response with its “proper” place or current 
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purpose.  Consider parental love, which evolved to compel parents to make potentially 
costly investments in their offspring and kin.  This emotion is often co-opted, however, 
insofar as parents feel love for, and invest in, genetically unrelated children; in some 
cases, parents exert tremendous energy and expense to acquire children who have no 
genetic relation to them.  From an evolutionary perspective, this is irrational.  Feeling 
parental love for a child from halfway across the world would seem to be, in Kelly’s 
term, a “mismatch.” 
 Likewise, Tooby and Cosmides (2005) have argued that humans have cognitive 
capacities that evolved for the purpose of reasoning about social exchange and 
coordination.  One of these capacities is the ability to tell when rules or contracts have 
been violated—a capacity that requires conditional reasoning.  If that’s right, then the 
ability to do formal (and informal) logic may be a byproduct of this capacity, yet this 
does not make us skeptics about logic. 
 Byproduct hypotheses can be useful in demonstrating why some behavior or 
capacity regularly goes awry.  Yet the fact that something is a byproduct does not show 
that it does, in fact, go awry.  In order to know this, we would need to have some 
independent or antecedent method for checking correctness.  But in the case of moral 
judgment, this kind of method is absent—the question of how to verify moral claims (or 
whether they can be verified at all) is vexed, and does not look to be settled any time 
soon.  Without such a method, the fact that disgust is a byproduct tells us nothing about 
the probable accuracy of disgust.  Thus the argument based on the fact that moral disgust 
is some sort of auxiliary disgust or side-effect of natural selection fails to lead to a 
normatively significant conclusion. 
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2.2 The Plasticity of Disgust 
 Christopher Knapp (2003) argues that the plasticity of the disgust response rules 
out any possibility of using disgust to “anchor” an evaluative discourse.  Knapp’s 
argument rests on the fact that the disgust acquisition mechanism is “designed to be 
triggered by different things in different people,” as evidenced by the evolutionary 
origins and ontogenic development of the disgust response.  If disgust is to support any 
normatively loaded discourse, Knapp contends, “it must be the case that the properties 
that make something fit-for-disgust are subject-invariant” (2003: 274).  And they are not.  
Therefore, Knapp argues, “the structure of the disgust response is too plastic to anchor an 
evaluative property.” (2003: 277)  If that’s right, there’s no sense in debating whether 
something actually is disgusting, and no interesting “evaluative conception of 
disgustingness”: debates over whether something is disgusting are “pointless, or 
uninteresting, or both” (276).  Normative disputes are not like this, however, so there can 
be nothing normative about disgust ascriptions.  To report finding something disgusting 
is to report some fact about one’s own (likely idiosyncratic) reaction to it, but this is not 
sufficient to ground an evaluative judgment, much less a moral one. 
 There are two problems with this line of argument.  The first is the move from 
design to plasticity, and the second is with the claim that plasticity precludes normativity.  
To see why the first move is dubious, consider Knapp’s analogy with language.  On the 
Chomskian picture, the innately prepared mechanism via which we acquire language is 
designed to be triggered by the local language.  Which specific language we end up with 
is dependent on which language we are exposed to during a constrained/limited 
developmental window.  But this does not necessarily mean that the mechanism is 
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plastic, insofar as it can only acquire the grammar(s) it’s exposed to during that period.  
(Though it can, of course, be augmented; one can learn a second, third, or fourth 
language, but this is a much more effortful process.)  This is because language aims at 
coordination.  The mechanism can only acquire whichever language it is exposed to 
during a specific window, and this limited acquisition period facilitates coordination.  
The mechanism is plastic in that it requires cultural or environmental input to operate 
effectively.9  The same can be said for the disgust acquisition mechanism: it may be 
plastic insofar as it requires environmental or cultural input in order to deliver a set of 
outputs, but this can also be put as: it is designed (at least, as Knapp describes it) so that 
the outputs it delivers are fixed by something very specific: the prevailing cultural norms.   
 Even if disgust were completely plastic, would Knapp’s denial of normativity 
follow?  I think not.  At the very least, it would not follow straightforwardly, for two 
reasons.  First, the biological or innate mechanism by which some norm, emotion or 
faculty is acquired is not the sole source of constraints on that norm, emotion, or faculty.  
It may be that the faculty through which moral norms themselves are acquired is 
infinitely plastic, but that considerations about the nature of human sociality and 
cooperation constrain—perhaps even uniquely—which norms are available in the 
environment for acquisition.  Cultural transmission, unrelated cognitive limitations, and 
other environmental factors can all narrow the set of available inputs.  This brings us to 
the second flaw in Knapp’s argument, which is its failure to explain why some response 
has to be “subject invariant” to ground an evaluative property.  As Gert (2007: 347) 
observes, “Knapp’s markers of evaluative properties turn out to be nothing more than 
                                                
9 For a detailed description of the French doctor Jean-Marc Itard’s efforts to educate a feral adolescent in 
the early 19th century, see Lane 1976. 
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markers of objective properties.”  This suggests that Knapp equates normativity with 
objectivity, but this is tendentious to say the least—absent additional argument, that some 
facts/judgments/claims may be both relative and normatively significant.  Indignation, for 
example, is aroused in different people by different things, and yet it plainly evaluates its 
object.  So plasticity alone is insufficient grounds for denying disgust a role in evaluative 
or normative discourse. 
 
2.3 Disgust as Distortion 
 One might be tempted to argue that based on the experiments discussed above, it 
is simply self-evident that disgust distorts our moral judgment and is therefore not to be 
trusted: if the mere occurrence of disgust can lead to the judgment that bringing 
interesting speakers to address a campus group is morally wrong, then how can we trust 
judgments of wrongness that stem from or co-occur with a feeling of disgust?  The 
answer, some have suggested, is that we can’t. Disgust is, at bottom, untrustworthy.  And 
in the pantheon of emotions, disgust is thought to be especially and uniquely 
untrustworthy: Nussbaum (2004: 13) argues that “shame and disgust are different from 
anger and fear, in that they are especially likely to be normatively distorted” while Kekes 
(1992: 438) points out that disgust is “fickle” and therefore may be unreliable.  Using 
disgust as any sort of guide to immorality is “problematic and irrational… across the 
board” (Nussbaum, 2004: 102).  
 The problem with this argument isn’t that disgust doesn’t cause distortions in 
judgment or cognitive biases—it’s that so many other emotions do.  For example, Isen 
(1984; see also Levine and Pizarro, 2006) found that inducing positive emotions made 
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subjects significantly more likely (72% vs. 40% in the control condition) to give an 
erroneous, but intuitively plausible, answer to a physics problem.  More generally, 
positive affect correlated with subjects’ reliance on heuristics to solve problems, and led 
to more erroneous responses to a wide variety of questions.  Schwarz (2002) surveys a 
variety of ways in which emotions influence cognition; subjects experiencing negative 
emotions are more likely to engage in bottom up, data-driven processing.   
 More specifically, anger and sadness have implications for cognition: anger 
makes people more likely to attribute their misfortune to an individual rather than 
nonagentic factors, while sadness has the opposite effect (see, e.g., Keltner, Ellsworth, & 
Edwards, 1993).  Anger also increases reliance on stereotypes (Bodenhausen et al, 1994; 
Park and Banaji, 2000).  Sadness, on the other hand, leads people “to rely less on 
stereotypes and to perform better on deductive reasoning tasks” (Levine and Pizarro, 
2006: 8).   
 Emotions affect moral judgment even when they are not directed at the judgment 
as such: Valdesolo and DeSteno (2006) found that subjects who had viewed a humorous 
video were more likely to favor a utilitarian solution to a moral dilemma.  Strohminger et 
al (in press) demonstrate that while mirth made subjects more likely to favor utilitarian 
solutions over deontological ones, another positive emotion, elevation,10 made subjects 
less likely to do so.  A third emotion, empathy, may explain the rather bizarre finding that 
as the number of people harmed by an action increases, the punishment that subjects—
and real-life jurors—assign to the perpetrator decreases.  So the punishment assigned for 
                                                
10 Strohminger et al (in press) explain that elevation comes from “witnessing acts of moral beauty,” and is 
associated with “reverence”; experimentally, the emotion is induced by giving participants stories from 




defrauding three people is actually more severe than the punishment assigned for 
defrauding thirty—both in the lab and in the courtroom (Nordgren & McDonnell, 2010).  
One explanation is that it is easier to empathize with three victims than with thirty, and it 
is this increased empathy that causes the increased punishment.  In this case, empathy 
leads us to make irrational decisions—surely harming thirty people is worse than causing 
that same harm to three people.  But to rule out moral judgments based on or involving 
empathy would be to rule out a lot. 
  Concluding that because of disgust’s role in cognitive biases it has no legitimate 
role to play in moral judgment would mean concluding that other emotions, both positive 
and negative, likewise have no legitimate role to play.  And this would be trouble for 
noncognitivists and sentimentalists, among others.   
One might think, ‘so much the worse for sentimentalism’.  Josh Greene (2001, 
2008) and Peter Singer (2005) have both suggested that we should throw out or discount 
affect-driven moral judgments as unreliable and adopt a utilitarian consequentialist view, 
since the latter has its origins in, and is supported by, reason rather than affect.  But even 
if one were inclined to grant this dubious dichotomy, why think reason is any more 
reliable than affect as a guide to immorality?   In particular, why think reason any more 
innocent of distortion or bias than emotion?  In fact reason is just as susceptible to this 
line of argument as emotion: it is not only affect, but also cognitive and metacognitive 
states that influence our moral judgments in ways that might be called ‘distorting’.  If 
emotion is guilty of distorting judgments, then reason is not innocent in this respect.  As 
Hauskeller (2006: 578) notes, “The problem of distinguishing between mere prejudice 
and legitimate concerns is not less of a problem for the rationalist than it is for the 
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sentimentalist.”  So the argument threatens skepticism regardless of whether one’s theory 
locates moral judgment in affect, reason, or both.   
 Consider the relationship between spatial location and evaluative judgment.  
Casasanto (2009) found that when presented with a pair of job applicants, products, or 
alien creatures, subjects tended to identify the ‘good’ member as the topmost member, or 
the rightmost (when the pairs were oriented horizontally).  It’s hard to see how spatial 
location is morally relevant.  Yet it is also ubiquitous.  In real life as well as in many 
experimental designs, objects are definitely positioned relative either to ourselves or to 
each other (and note that even where the prompt is a single sentence smack in the middle 
of the page, the subject is typically asked to respond by circling a point on a Likert 
scale—which is arrayed left to right).  Indeed, Laham, Alter and Goodwin (2009) found 
that something as innocuous as typeface influenced subjects’ moral evaluations (see also 
Schwarz, 2004; Song & Schwarz, 2010).  Anger, sadness, empathy, knowledge of the 
number of victims, spatial location, and typeset— all these factors lead to cognitive 
biases and instances of what appear to be distortions in reasoning and/or judgment.  Yet 
they are ubiquitous enough that skepticism about judgments involving these factors 
would amount to skepticism about most- if not all- moral judgments.   
 The moral of the story is this: we ought to be extremely wary of inferring from the 
fact that seemingly irrelevant framing effects can affect a judgment to the conclusion that 
judgments of that type are unwarranted.  Avoiding wholesale skepticism requires 
adopting a more refined treatment of framing effects, biases and ‘distortions’.  The fact 
that a moral judgment is influenced by a seemingly irrelevant emotion, piece of 
information, or other feature, licenses us to conclude neither that that feature itself is 
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always distorting, nor that the resultant judgment is untrustworthy.  While a principle that 
dictates when and how affect results in an untrustworthy judgment or appraisal is 
desirable, the goal of this paper is not to arrive at such a principle.  Indeed, the 
considerations discussed above reveal the difficulties any attempt to do so would face.  
Most likely, we will need to draw our distinction more finely, perhaps approaching the 
issue on a case-by-case (emotion-by-emotion) basis.  The next argument I’ll discuss 
illustrates how the skeptic can avail himself of this strategy.  It appeals to features 
particular to disgust in an attempt to establish skepticism about disgust without 
implicating other emotions or cognitive processes.   
 
2.4 Disgust as Magical Thinking 
  Witches don’t sink in water.  How do I know?  Because there are no witches.  
People used to think there were; they attributed magical powers to certain individuals 
(usually women) and accused these individuals of being witches.  But then they figured 
out that there really was no such thing as magic- hence Frazer’s and subsequently 
Nussbaum’s pejorative use of the phrase ‘magical thinking’- so nothing had the property 
of having magical powers.  Given the centrality of magic to the concept of a witch, they 
concluded that there were no witches.  An analogous move in the case of disgust would 
identify a property or feature that is central to our concept <disgusting> and show that 
nothing has that feature.  Therefore, disgust, in attributing disgustingness to its object, is 
systematically misleading, erroneous even.  In short, we have arrived at an error theory of 
disgust.   
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What is unique to disgust, recall, is its tendency to elicit a sense of offensiveness, 
contamination, and contamination potency.  Moral disgust is therefore based on magical 
thinking—it represents a kind of category mistake.  Nussbaum introduces her disgust 
skepticism by raising precisely this concern: 
Disgust, I shall argue, is very different from anger, in that its thought-content 
is typically unreasonable, embodying magical ideas of contamination, and 
impossible aspirations to purity, immortality, and nonanimality that are just 
not in line with human life as we know it.11 
 
Nussbaum argues that it is not its attribution of contamination potency per se, but 
associated beliefs about animality- in particular disgust’s role as a reminder of our animal 
nature- that is problematic: “Because disgust embodies a shrinking from contamination 
that is associated with the human desire to be nonanimal, it is frequently hooked up with 
various forms of shady social practice, in which the discomfort people feel over the fact 
of having an animal body is projected outwards onto vulnerable people and groups.  
These reactions are irrational, in the normative sense, both because they embody an 
aspiration to be a kind of creature that one is not”  (2004: 74, emphasis mine)  (Notice 
also that if this line of reasoning is correct, it is no mere accident of history that disgust 
has motivated morally problematic policies.)  Nussbaum’s argument seems to be: 
1. Disgust embodies contamination fears associated with a desire to distance 
ourselves from our animal nature 
                                                
11 Nussbaum thinks that emotions have cognitive content and so are subject to evaluation as reasonable and 
unreasonable.  See also D’Arms and Jacobson’s (2000) discussion of the ‘fittingness’ of emotions, and in 
particular disgust.  While D’Arms and Jacobson disagree with Nussbaum’s claim that emotions have 
cognitive content, and deny that they embody judgments, they nonetheless agree that judging something 
disgusting involves presenting that thing as possessing certain properties or attributes; disgust and other 
emotions can represent objects correctly or incorrectly.  One does not, therefore, have to adopt a cognitive 
account of emotions in order to view their occurrence as being more or less warranted, and therefore 
amenable to criticism. 
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2. Our animal nature is a source of anxiety because it reminds us of “a type of 
vulnerability that we share with other animals, the propensity to decay and 
become waste products ourselves.” (Nussbaum, 2004: 92) 
3. Disgust polices the boundary between human and animal nature 
4. Thus disgust presents its object as less- or other-than human; it dehumanizes its 
object 
5. This in turn permits us to treat those individuals or groups towards whom we feel 
disgust as less-than-human. 
 
The above argument, if successful, establishes that the link between the content of the 
disgust response and the dehumanizing treatment associated with moral disgust is not just 
historical, but conceptual.12  I will take up the question of contamination in section 3; 
here I focus on the claim that disgust is a response to anxiety about our animality and 
mortality.  Haidt et al (1997: 110) have argued that “most of the objects that meet… 
[Americans’] definition of disgust are indeed animals (including humans)… or are 
disgusting by virtue of their contact with them,” and Rozin et al (1993) argue that at its 
core, the emotion is really “animal-origin disgust,” and that other types of disgust are 
elaborated out of this core concern.  Our revulsion to animals and reminders of our 
animal nature is, according to Rozin, a way of avoiding reminders that we, too, are 
animals, and as such, are mortal.  Whereas Haidt et al, and Rozin, include humans as part 
of the category of ‘animals,’ Nussbaum associates the term with a kind of 
dehumanization: to view someone as animal is to view them as less than a person.   
Unfortunately, like Haidt and Rozin before her, Nussbaum provides little support 
for the claim that disgust is about avoiding reminders of death and decay per se as 
opposed to avoiding them because death and decay tend to present contamination dangers 
                                                
12 Compare: the connection between romantic love and greeting cards, though empirically robust, is not 
conceptual; rather, it’s mediated by a series of historical events that, while partly enabled by some of the 
features of romantic love (it motivates people to make costly declarations and displays of their feelings) 
don’t reveal anything deep and meaningful unique to romantic love itself.   
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of their own.  Nor does she fully explain why these concerns should be linked to animals.  
As she acknowledges, certain traits such as “strength and speed, and the animals who 
exemplify them” (2004: 92) are admired.  Many cultures have celebrated, rather than 
resisted, the continuity between human and animal, either by deifying animals or by 
constructing cosmologies in which humans are descended from or created by animals 
(see Levi-Strauss, 1966).   As Miller (1997: 46) points out, if disgust were aimed at 
distancing reminders of our animal nature, we’d expect that animals most like us would 
be most disgusting, and this is simply not so.  And “animal secretions,” which both Rozin 
and Nussbaum suggest are the properties in virtue of which animality and death and 
decay become linked, have been used by many cultures in magic and religious rituals, 
often as a means of purification (in rituals involving sympathetic magic, it is sometimes 
assumed that only the contaminant itself can remove contamination; this suggests that 
contamination is a primary rather than an incidental concern of such performances).13  
Miller has suggested that disgust is triggered by a superabundance of life, rather than 
reminders of death (1997: 40-42), but both claims, and the evidence used to support 
them, can be explained in terms of contamination concerns without adverting to claims 
that they trigger anxiety by reminding us either of death or of life.   
 Nussbaum might respond that contamination alone cannot account for disgust’s 
tendency to lead to the dehumanization of certain individuals or groups.  But this 
tendency is not sufficient to establish the causal conclusion Nussbaum needs.  She argues 
that “Disgust… revolves around a wish to be a type of being one that one is not, namely 
                                                
13 The earliest blood transfusions were from animals to humans, forcing people at the time to grapple 
directly with the question of whether humans and animals were essentially different; see Tucker (2011).  
Tucker notes that at the time, animal blood was actually often thought to be more pure than human blood. 
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nonanimal and immortal,” and that concerns about contamination are instrumental in our 
attempts to realize this wish:  “thoughts about contamination serve the ambition of 
making ourselves nonhuman,” (2004: 102) but why not think instead that an aversion to 
bodily fluids and decaying flesh (both human and animal) and to snakes and insects 
(which Nussbaum argues signify decay, and Miller argues signify an overabundance of 
life) both serve the ambition of protecting ourselves from contamination?  If that’s right, 
then dehumanization and ostracism aren’t implicated in disgust’s cognitive or conceptual 
content/nature/structure; rather, they are associated with disgust insofar as they are 
effective, psychologically and physically, at removing or warding off the threat of social 
contamination.  To show that moral disgust is intrinsically dehumanizing, the skeptic 
needs to demonstrate disgust’s tendency to dehumanize or lead to the ostracism of its 
elicitors as necessarily a result of the way it presents its elicitor- in this case, as less than 
human- rather than as an optional reaction to some third, mediating presentation (in this 
case, contamination potency).  But isolation is, in the absence of a cure, an effective way 
of preventing the spread of contamination.  Thus there is no strong argument for thinking 
of disgust as necessarily dehumanizing rather than as capitalizing on/resulting from our 
capacity to dehumanize others (see Zimbardo, 2007; Doris and Murphy, 2007) as a 
strategy for avoiding potential contaminants.  Therefore this route to an error theory fails 
because we have no reason to think that disgust is committed to magical thinking or some 






3.  Doubting Disgust 
The disgust skeptic at this point can adopt a less direct strategy.  Rather than 
advancing a skeptical argument, they can challenge the disgust advocate to more 
specifically state how disgust is involved in moral judgment and then argue against the 
proposed account.  If no plausible role for disgust can be found, the skeptic’s case is 
bolstered; certainly, the burden of proof is shifted back onto the disgust advocate to come 
up with a more promising proposal.  In this section I discuss three ways the disgust 
advocate might spell out the nature of disgust’s involvement in normative assessment in 
order to vindicate its role in moral judgment.  The first two accounts fail, though for 
different and illuminating reasons.  The third, which takes up the issue of contamination 
potency, may succeed in providing an account of how and why disgust is a justified 
response to moral wrongness, though it leaves open legitimate concerns about whether 
disgust is a particularly efficacious way of coping with it. 
 
3.1 Disgust as Constitutive of Moral Judgment 
 Most accounts of moral judgment accord at least some role to affect.  Disgust is a 
specific type of affect.  It also, as Nussbaum and D’Arms and Jacobson point out, 
presents its objects a certain way, so it’s possible to give a cognitivist analysis of disgust 
discourse.14  Perhaps, then, disgust is the moral judgment?    Above, I mentioned that 
Haidt suggests that moral judgments are no more than our affect-laden intuitive responses 
to moral violations.  If this is right, maybe to be disgusted by something just is to judge 
that is morally wrong.  Again, above I examined some evidence suggesting that disgust 
                                                
14 Though not necessary; see note 10 above. 
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generates appraisals of moral wrongness; perhaps the disgust advocate can offer an 
account on which disgust doesn’t have a role in moral judgment; it just is the moral 
judgment.  To get this proposal off the ground, its proponent will have to explain why we 
are not constantly judging objects on the street, our own bodily functions, babies’ diapers, 
and so on immoral.  Cockroaches, though repugnant, are not immoral.  Likewise for some 
foods—types of offal, for example.  So the claim that the disgust reaction is constitutive 
of moral valuation requires distinguishing these types of disgust from the kind of disgust 
we feel for the child rapist, or the businessman who embezzles from a charity.  An 
alternative approach might be to appeal to the fact that the cases involve persons and their 
actions toward one another- that moral disgust is distinguished by its concern with 
people’s attitudes and behaviors- but this will not do the trick.  We feel core disgust 
towards people, and fail to feel moral disgust towards them, even where this is elicited by 
a person or an action.  We may feel disgust when looking at a burn victim, or I might feel 
disgust watching someone vomit, but these are not moral judgments.  Indeed, some 
conduct that disgusts us is morally neutral or even lauded, perhaps even more so because 
it is disgusting: sanitation workers and nurses perform jobs that are disgusting but 
socially necessary. 
 
3.2 Disgust as Evidence of Moral Wrongness 
 Another approach would be to take disgust as evidence of moral wrongness.  This 
may be what Leon Kass has in mind when he writes that though disgust is “not 
argument,” nonetheless “repugnance is the emotional expression of deep wisdom, beyond 
reason’s power fully to articulate it” (1997: 18).  In a similar vein, Kahan (1998) has 
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argued for allowing disgust to play a role in criminal sentencing, with murders that cause 
disgust receiving higher sentences, on the grounds that disgust helps identify legally 
significant features such as excessive cruelty; Nussbaum writes that Kahan takes disgust 
to be “a useful… criterion, giving us information that is relevant to the legal regulation of 
certain types of acts” (2004: 85).  If a murder that contains elements that provoke disgust 
deserves a stiffer sentence than one that does not, presumably this is because it is more 
wrong, as evidenced by its disgustingness.   
 The problem arises when we ask in virtue of what, exactly, disgust evinces 
wrongness.  Consider guilt again: as an emotion, guilt carries with it a motivation to 
make reparation, which is prima facie evidence that one believes one has done some kind 
of damage which needs to be repaired.  Guilt therefore tracks a kind of damage that’s 
linked to moral violation, and therefore is prima facie evidence of moral wrongness.  
Disgust, on the other hand, motivates withdrawal; if it is evidence of anything, it is of a 
contamination threat.  So one way of spelling out the evidential link is: disgust tracks 
contamination and therefore immorality.  But contamination is far from obviously 
immoral.  Indeed, the kind of contamination much disgust protects us from is patently 
amoral.  Isn’t this a problem?  And doesn’t treating people as contaminants seem like a 
kind of category mistake?     
 
3.3 Poisons, Parasites and… Persons?  
 The claim that disgust is evidence of wrongness is unconvincing unless it can 
identify some property that disgust is tracking—and show that some things do have that 
property.  Earlier I considered- and rejected- Nussbaum’s suggestion that disgust’s 
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central role was tracking violations of the human-animal divide; now I want to consider 
another proposal: disgust tracks contamination. This is not accidental, but one of 
disgust’s primary functions.  The idea of contamination potency is part of what 
distinguishes disgust from mere aversive distaste, and it is one reason why disgust is so 
effective at motivating avoidance of “poisons and parasites” (Kelly, in press).  As we saw 
above, Kelly argues that moral disgust’s presentation of its elicitors as polluting or 
contaminating is systematically misleading. This should be distinguished from the claim 
that disgust itself is sometimes misleading; based on its evolutionary role in protecting us 
from “pathogens and poisons” (Kelly, in press), we should expect disgust to be ‘cautious’ 
and overgeneralize.  But this moral disgust overgeneralized to the point of being co-opted 
into a whole new domain, one which it was never designed to handle; therefore, moral 
disgust committed a category mistake.    Conduct or behavior, the purview of morality, is 
not the kind of thing that can be polluting or contaminating.  But this, as I’ll now show, is 
false.15   
 That the language of contamination is used to describe social phenomena is, as 
noted above, undeniable: drug use is ‘an epidemic’; marketing campaigns, videos, and 
songs are ‘viral’.  But is this language metaphorical?  Do behaviors and beliefs spread 
through contact and exposure?  In answering these questions I will side-step the issue of 
how best to define disease (though for a good overview see Murphy, 2010), since my 
interest is less in the etiology of the phenomena under consideration and more on their 
transmission.   
                                                
15 Kelly could redefine ‘contamination’ so that it is a property only of physical or biological entities, and 




 We also need to distinguish the related questions of whether thinking of behaviors 
as contaminating leads to the adoption of morally problematic policies, or whether the 
language of contamination is the most effective approach to changing patterns of 
behaviors or attitudes.  The conflation of these questions is an instance of what D’Arms 
and Jacobson dub ‘the moralistic fallacy’: “the question of whether F is fitting in the 
sense relevant to whether its object X is ϕ… is indeed logically distinct from the moral, 
prudential, and all-in practical questions… considerations which bear on these further 
questions are irrelevant to property ascription.” (2000: 71)  Identifying these type of 
considerations is not the goal here; I won’t be aiming to answer the question of whether 
disgust is the all things considered right response to wrongness.  Rather, I will argue that 
contrary to what some disgust skeptics have claimed, there are behaviors and attitudes to 
which disgust is a fitting response.  Some behaviors and attitudes really do have the 
properties disgust ascribes to them, namely, contamination potency.   
 Above I suggested that if disgust dehumanizes or leads to the ostracism of its 
object, it may be because isolation or ostracism are in fact often the most effective way to 
guard against contamination.  Therefore, I argued, disgust may co-opt a preexisting 
propensity on our part to dehumanize other groups or people.  But the language of 
contamination could itself be essentially linked to this dehumanizing or ostracizing 
attitude, in which case it, too, would be essentially problematic.  So if a tendency to 
present its elicitor as less than human and to motivate ostracism of that object is essential 
to moral disgust, then the disgust skeptic might argue, via a strategy similar to the error-
theoretic argument discussed above, that there are no behaviors or attitudes that merit 
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moral disgust.  Before asking the question of whether actions or attitudes can be 
contaminating, then, it’s worth pausing for a moment to consider this possibility. 
 Certainly the language of disease and contamination has been invoked to justify 
policies ranging from questionable to reprehensible.  The idea of crack as an ‘epidemic’ 
was used to motivate the passage of stringent and punitive laws— from 1986 until 
recently, crack cocaine was the only drug for which a first-time possession conviction 
carried a federally mandated minimum sentence.  In upholding New York State’s 
exceptionally punitive drug sentencing laws (the ‘Rockefeller Laws’) the appellate court 
(in People v Thompson, 83NY 2nd 3/30/94) wrote that "drug-related crimes may be much 
more prevalent, that is, have a higher and rising incidence, than other crimes comparably 
punished or equally grave crimes not as severely punished, requiring greater isolation and 
deterrence," appealing to the idea that drug use and dealing is a greater social threat 
because of its propensity to spread from person-to-person than a similarly “grave” crime 
(under the Rockefeller laws, a first-time possession conviction could lead to a stiffer 
sentence than a rape or homicide conviction).  This might seem like sufficient evidence 
that an attitude of contamination is the wrong way to approach moral or social problems 
such as drug abuse.   
 But leaving aside the tricky question of the most effective policy solutions to drug 
problems, let me make a few points on whether the language of contamination is 
essentially or necessarily linked to more punitive or ostracizing attitudes.  Thibodeau and 
Boroditsky (2011) found that when subjects were given a description of a town with a 
crime problem, presenting the problem in terms of a disease or ‘virus’ actually made 
subjects more likely to suggest adopting policies that involved social reform and 
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rehabilitation; they were also more likely to describe the primary role of a police officer 
as preventing crime, educating children, and serving as role models (as opposed to 
capturing and punishing criminals).  These results, though of course far from conclusive, 
suggest that presenting behaviors as contagions may lead to a less punitive view of those 
behaviors and shift the focus from punishment to prevention.  If the problem with the 
proposal that disgust tracks contamination isn’t that it necessarily results in the adoption 
of problematic attitudes or policies, the next question to ask is whether there is any 
factual support for the claim.  Is moral disgust, in presenting moral violations as 
contaminating, committing some sort of category mistake?  Should we read the language 
of disease and contamination here as merely metaphorical, or is there evidence that 
behaviors and attitudes, and the people who possess them, are contaminants in much the 
same way as poisons and pathogens? 
 The Framingham Heart Study began in 1948 with 5,209 men and women between 
the ages of 30 and 60; its aim was to identify the causes and correlates of cardiovascular 
disease.  In order to do so, researchers obtained detailed physical and behavioral data on 
each of their subjects; more importantly, they followed up on their subjects every two 
years, and subsequently enrolled the children of these subjects in the study: in 1971 5,000 
offspring of the original cohort joined the study, and in 2002 a third generation was 
added.  All in all, the researchers obtained detailed medical and behavioral data on almost 
15,000 subjects from the town of Framingham, Massachusetts.  On intake forms, subjects 
were asked to “name a close friend who can find you in case we can’t.” (Couzin 2009)    
 Researchers subsequently realized that the inclusion of this question meant that 
the data could be mined for information on how behaviors, attitudes, and other conditions 
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such as obesity spread through social networks.  They found that subjects’ happiness, and 
their chances of becoming obese, quitting smoking, or getting divorced, all increased as 
their friends developed these conditions or behaviors (or, in the case of happiness, 
increased as their friends’ happiness increased).  They also found that the behaviors 
spread not just between friends but between friends of friends.  So, for example, an 
individual is 50% more likely to drink heavily if a friend does so as well, but the effect 
remains strong even at two degrees of separation—if a friend of a friend drinks heavily, 
the individual is 36% more likely to do so.  The same effect holds for all the factors 
examined so far—from obesity to divorce to happiness.  (Physical proximity doesn’t 
explain the effect; the behavior of neighbors, for example, had no significant effect.)  
This data shows how behaviors spread through a population, and demonstrate that one 
need not even come into direct contact with a person to be affected by their behaviors or 
attitudes—third parties (mutual friends) can act as ‘carriers’. 
 This last finding is the truly striking one.  That people are influenced by the 
behaviors of those around them isn’t surprising; after all, it’s what makes imitative 
learning possible.  But that behaviors spread not just through direct contact but through 
contact with those who have come into contact with it is a powerful evidence that they do 
have contamination potency—any object- or in this case, person- that has come into 
contact with or been exposed to the behavior has the power to contaminate others.  This 
result is not specific to alcohol—the findings have been replicated with respect to obesity, 
smoking, divorce, happiness, and suicide.  
 Nor are the results specific or unique to this study.  The idea that behaviors or 
attitudes can be a kind of social contagion has informed some of the theoretical work on 
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racism or prejudice (e.g., Allport 1954) and recently, Grim et al (2005) show, using 
computational modeling, that contact with other groups both reduces prejudice and 
thwarts the spread of prejudice in the first place.  The contagion effect of suicide has been 
noted and remarked upon for centuries- it’s sometimes referred to as the ‘Werther effect’, 
after the wave of suicides following in the wake of Goethe’s Young Werther, in which the 
protagonist kills himself16- and is potent enough that most modern media outlets 
purposely play down reports of or simply refrain from reporting suicide and refrain from 
giving details of the method used, so as not to encourage imitators.  Positive attitudes and 
emotions also spread; as Hill et al (2010: 3828) note, “happiness could be thought of as a 
form of social infection.”  Cooperative behavior, as measured by performance on public-
goods games, also demonstrates a contagion effect; subjects playing with generous 
individuals were more likely to behave generously in future interactions, even when these 
were played with different individuals than the prior round.   Most striking, perhaps, is 
that subjects’ behavior was influenced, not just by whom they played with, but by whom 
the people they played with had played with.  That is, the effects of cooperation could be 
seen up to three degrees of separation.   
 Behaviors and attitudes spread through a group in much the same way a disease 
does.  And while an important disanalogy might seem to be the fact that germs are 
invisible, while our friendships are not, the fact that these behaviors and attitudes affect 
parties who don’t come directly into contact with them means that these, too, have the 
potential to be invisible contagions.   
                                                
16 The effect was first named by Phillips (1974: 340), who quotes Goethe: “my friends… [thought to] 
imitate a novel like this in real life and, in any case, shoot themselves; and what occurred at first among a 
few took place later among the general public.”  
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 The disgust advocate’s strongest argument, then, is that moral disgust tracks 
social contamination.  But as mentioned above, not all contagion is bad contagion.  
Contagion itself is neither good nor bad; it is the attitudes and behaviors in question that 
make something contaminating in a deleterious sense.  In the case of disease, these 
deleterious consequences are rather easily observed, and tend not to be controversial—
most people would agree that pain, vomiting, weakness, and death are all bad things.  But 
in the case of moral contamination matters are less settled: the extent and depth of 
controversy over many first-order moral questions means that what one man or group 
considers a contaminant, another might consider laudable and worth encouraging.  The 
question of whether some behavior or attitude has the kind of contamination potency 
disgust ascribes to it, then, can be disambiguated into the question of whether the 
behavior has potentially deleterious effects and the question of whether the behavior is 
contagious.  Likewise, the question of whether moral disgust is an appropriate response 
to some act can be disambiguated into the question of whether that act is really immoral, 
and whether the act is potentially contaminating.   
   
Conclusion: Disgust, Affect, and Evaluative Skepticism 
I have argued that claims to the effect that disgust ‘distorts’ moral judgment or is 
somehow an illegitimate component of moral judgment are problematic insofar as they 
are too coarse-grained to distinguish disgust from other affective and cognitive features 
of moral judgment; they risk throwing the baby out with the bathwater. The 
considerations adduced above highlight both the need for and the difficulty of specifying 
exactly when and how supposed ‘distorting’ factors, biases, or framing effects should 
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make us suspicious of the resultant judgment.  The issue is especially pressing for 
evaluative judgments (as opposed to, say, judgments about probability) as we have no 
agreed-upon, independent procedure or standard against which to measure our judgments.  
But it is not specific or unique to sentimentalist theories of evaluative judgment, as 
revealed by the data suggesting the existence of (potentially distorting) metacognitive 
influences on such judgments.  Furthermore, many judgments cannot be presented 
independently of some kind of frame—this paper, for example, had to be written in some 
font or another.  The case of disgust serves as a useful reminder that if we are to avoid 
widespread skepticism about evaluative judgments, we must take a more fine-grained 
approach to specifying when and under what circumstances an emotion or other cognitive 
process is deserving of suspicion.  Such accounts must carefully examine and engage 
with the specific content or presentation associated with the emotions and cognitive 
processes involved in evaluative judgment.  A global assessment of the reliability of 
affect, emotion, or cognition is desirable from a theoretical standpoint, but problematic 










“I think that if one were to get all the people in the world to gather together the things 
they found unacceptable, and then to take from this pile the things they found acceptable, 
not a single custom would remain, but in the end they would all have been distributed 
among the peoples of the world.”  -Anonymous, Dissoi Logoi  
 
“…If we had been ignorant, say, of the custom amongst the Egyptians of marrying 
sisters, we should have asserted wrongly that it was universally agreed that men ought 
not to marry sisters, -even so, in regard to those practices where we notice no 
discrepancy, it is not proper for us to affirm that there is no disagreement about them, 
since, as I said, disagreement about them may possibly exist among some of the nations 
which are unknown to us.”  -Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism 
 
Introduction 
 Philosophers often speak of the argument from disagreement, as if it were a single 
thing, when in fact there are many arguments from disagreement that take disagreement 
to be evidence for moral antirealism or evidence against moral realism.  In this paper I 
discuss four arguments from disagreement and assess their strength.  Some philosophers 
have suggested that actual moral disagreement is irrelevant to the arguments from 
disagreement; the existence of a priori versions of the argument that appeal to possible 
disagreement, the thought goes, renders appeals to the empirical record otiose.  Part one 
is devoted to showing this claim is false: I discuss two versions of the a priori argument 
from disagreement and show that they can- and should- garner support from an empirical 
inquiry into instances of moral disagreement.  I go on to show that, though the empirical 
 
 43 
evidence supports the a priori arguments from disagreement, a posteriori arguments 
proceed more smoothly and are able to sidestep debates over the semantics of moral 
discourse. Using the aforementioned empirical evidence and the realist’s 
responses to the a priori arguments, I argue that the a posteriori argument can be 
reformulated as a kind of dilemma for the realist: they are left open to either an inference 
to the best explanation argument from disagreement or a kind of skeptical argument from 
disagreement.  I conclude by considering some objections. 
 Before discussing the arguments, a word about terminology is in order.  For the 
purposes of this paper, I refer to the proponent of the argument from disagreement as a 
moral antirealist.  What I mean by this is just that the proponent of the argument denies 
moral realism; antirealism picks out a variety of views, but for present purposes, it is 
enough to distinguish realist from nonrealist views.  The term ‘realist’ has also been 
applied to a wide variety of views, so it will be useful to say something about how I use it 
in what follows.  I follow Michael Smith in taking ‘realism’ to refer to the view that 
“moral questions have correct answers… made correct by objective moral facts… and 
that by moralizing we can discover what these objective moral facts… are.” (1991: 399)  
Smith goes on to offer an analysis of objectivity: “the term… signifies the possibility of a 
convergence in views” (1991: 400).  This is an instance of what Horgan and Timmons 
(2008: 270) call the “rationalist” conception of objectivity, which is the conception I will 
be using throughout the paper.  On the rationalist conception, a domain is objective “if 
there is a method of thinking or reasoning whose use would yield… convergence in belief 
about the subject matter in question.”  With this terminology in place, I’ll begin by 
explicating the a priori arguments from disagreement. 
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1. A Priori Arguments from Disagreement 
 Since realism is committed to claims about moral facts and about moral 
knowledge, the antirealist has two targets at which to aim the argument from 
disagreement.  The metaphysical argument takes aim at moral facts; the epistemic 
argument takes aim at moral knowledge.  I discuss each in turn before arguing that, 
despite being a priori, the arguments are best evaluated via an empirical investigation into 
actual moral disagreement. 
 
A priori metaphysical:   
1. If two individuals disagree over a claim about an objective matter of fact, then 
one of them must be mistaken. 
2. It is possible for two individuals to disagree over moral claims and for neither of 
them to be mistaken. 
3. Therefore, moral claims do not concern objective matters of fact. 
 
A priori epistemic: 
1. If two individuals disagree over the truth of some claim, and they are epistemic 
peers with respect to that claim— i.e. neither has any reason for thinking his 
opponent more likely to be mistaken than he is— then they ought to suspend 
judgment about that claim; their belief in the truth or falsity of the claim is 
unjustified. 
2. The disagreement need not be actual; merely possible disagreement suffices to 
undermine justification in the way described above. 
3. It is possible (for all or for some subset of moral beliefs) for two epistemic peers 
to disagree over the truth of a moral claim. 
4. Therefore, we should suspend judgment about (all or some subset of) our moral 
beliefs; they are unjustified. 
 
The metaphysical version of the argument targets the realist’s claim that there are 
objective moral facts or properties; the epistemic version targets the idea that our moral 
beliefs or judgments can be justified.  The metaphysical argument takes the analysis of 
objectivity above as its starting point: if it’s possible for two people to have conflicting 
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beliefs about the truth of some moral claim, and for both to be correct/neither to be 
mistaken, then there are no objective moral facts.  It is possible, and so there are no 
objective moral facts.  Obviously, a lot hangs on the second premise here.  The first 
premise follows straightforwardly from the analysis of objective facts above.  In 
experimental work, denial of the possibility of faultless moral disagreement is often taken 
as diagnostic of moral realism (see, e.g., Goodwin and Darley 2007, Sarkissian et al in 
press).  Realists and antirealists alike should be inclined to accept the first premise of the 
metaphysical argument. 
The epistemic argument is more controversial; many epistemologists disagree 
with premise one, maintaining that even in the face of disagreement with an equally 
rational, informed peer, one is licensed to maintain one’s level of confidence in the belief 
at issue.  Premise one, though, claims that if one holds a belief that is denied “by another 
person of whom it is true that: you have no more reason to think that he or she is in error 
than you are” (McGrath 2008: 91) then that belief does not amount to knowledge; there is 
no reason why the belief must be actually denied by another person.  The mere possibility 
of such disagreement suffices to undermine claims to knowledge (cf. Kelly, 2008; 
Wedgewood, 2010).  Given that disagreement is possible for a great many— if not all— 
of our moral claims, we lack knowledge of, and should suspend judgment about, a 
significant number of moral claims/answers to moral questions.  But for reasons I discuss 
below, in the case of the epistemic argument, it is difficult to evaluate premise one 
without a discussion of premise two.   
What about the second premise?  This is the real sticking point.  That’s in part 
because the first premise is so ecumenical: if realists and antirealists both agree on what 
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objectivity requires, then their disagreement is over whether those requirements are met.  
Premise two is, essentially, the antirealist’s thesis; it amounts to a denial of moral 
realism.  Therefore asking a realist to concede it is unreasonable, and pointless: getting to 
antirealism via an argument that assumes the denial of realism accomplishes nothing.  
David Enoch (2009) has suggested that this argument cannot go through without begging 
the question against moral realism, and therefore can be summarily dismissed.  After all, 
he suggests, why can’t the realist simply respond by denying that such cases are possible 
and maintaining that the very fact that two parties disagree is evidence that one of them 
must be making a mistake?  If two parties disagree, for example, about the truth of some 
unproven mathematical conjecture, we feel confident that one of them is making a 
mistake, even if we have don’t know which one of them is mistaken, or what the mistake 
is.17  Why not make an analogous response in the case of moral disagreement?  Well, it’s 
certainly one way to avoid begging the question against realism.  But it seems to do so by 
begging the question against antirealism.   
This is one reason why the arguments about how best to respond to disagreement 
between epistemic peers in other discourses are not straightforwardly generalized to 
include moral disagreements.  In disagreements over arithmetic, it’s known that one party 
is making a mistake, and the issue is which party that is and whether one is entitled to 
assume that it must be the other party, or whether one ought to concede that the mistake 
might be one’s own.  But even the staunchest realist ought to admit that moral realism is 
less securely established than its mathematical counterpart.  (The question of whether and 
                                                
17 I return to this point below when I discuss objections to the argument from disagreement, since the 
analogy is sometimes taken to show that arguments from disagreement would, if successful, also 
undermine realism in science and mathematics. 
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to what extent realism enjoys a presumption in its favor in cases like these is one I take 
up in Chapter 3.)  In disagreements over moral claims, it’s certainly possible that one 
party must be mistaken, in which case it may be permissible to retain one’s confidence 
that the mistake belongs to one’s opponent or it may be that one’s confidence should be 
shaken.  But it’s also possible—that is, it should not be ruled out—that both parties are 
correct, in which case a third possibility is introduced: one is entitled to retain one’s 
original view, but not to conclude that one’s opponent is mistaken.18  This latter 
possibility is what the second premise aims to establish.  To dismiss such a possibility at 
the outset does mitigate the force of the argument against moral realism—but only by 
assuming the truth of moral realism.19  I suggest that what Enoch’s objection actually 
demonstrates is the difficulty of establishing premise two a priori—the realist denies such 
cases are possible, because his theoretical commitments rule it out.  The antirealist 
maintains it is, because he has no such commitments.  Therefore, I suggest that premise 
two is best established a posteriori.  That is, the best evidence that faultless moral 
disagreement is possible is that it actually exists.  In order to avoid begging the question, 
I’ll refer to cases of disagreement that aren’t explained by any ignorance, irrationality, or 
epistemic defect on the part of one or both of the parties as fundamental disagreements.  
                                                
18This suggests an intriguing possibility regarding the puzzling phenomenon of belief or attitude 
polarization (see Kelly 2008).  Suppose that in such cases, when exposed to good evidence for an opposing 
viewpoint, subjects actually conclude that there is no uniquely correct answer to the question under 
discussion.  Then increasing one’s credence in one’s original view is less irrational than it appears, since 
countervailing evidence is actually evidence that one’s view is not and need not be challenged by 
apparently conflicting positions or evidence. 
19 There is an interesting issue here about what, in metaethical debates, constitutes a neutral starting point 
or standpoint from which to debate, but I don’t tackle that issue here. 
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The suggestion I am making is that the best evidence for the possibility of faultless 
disagreement is an actual instance of fundamental disagreement. 
 The natural strategy for the proponent of either of these arguments is to find such 
cases; the natural strategy for the realist confronted with such cases is to deny that they 
are instances of fundamental moral disagreement, either by showing that one or both of 
the parties actually is at fault, or by showing that the disagreement is really about some 
other, non-moral issue. If the disagreement is really about, say, whether capital 
punishment has a deterrent effect, then it turns on some matter of fact that, though 
perhaps obscure, is nonetheless discoverable in principle.  Therefore the disagreement is 
not in fact fundamental—it is caused by ignorance on the part of one or both of the 
disputants.  Possible explanations of disagreement abound, and realists have identified 
several.  What they have not done is examine whether these actually explain specific 
instances of moral disagreement.  In what follows I discuss the realist’s proposed 
explanations— call these defusing explanations (a term introduced in Doris & Plakias 
2008)— and see whether they seem like promising explanations of instances of actual 
moral disagreement.   
 
2. Explaining versus Explaining Away 
Moral realists have suggested that the moral disagreement we observe is no threat to 
realism, because it can be attributed to one or more of the following defusing 
explanations.  I’ll explain each in turn; in the first two cases, I concede the explanations 
are indeed defusing, but I will go on to question whether they actually explain specific 
instances of disagreement.  In the latter two cases, I question the assumption that the 
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proposed explanation would be defusing; that is, I deny that the explanation represents an 
epistemic shortcoming.    
 
2.1 Non-moral Facts 
 Nearly every realist writing on disagreement has pointed to disagreement over 
relevant non-moral facts as an explanation: Boyd thinks, and Brink writes that “many 
genuine moral disagreements depend on disagreements over non-moral facts” (1989: 
199), and Boyd goes further, arguing that “agreement on non-moral issues would 
eliminate almost all disagreements about the sorts of moral issues which arise in ordinary 
moral practice” (1988: 213; emphasis in the original). 
 
2.2 Irrationality or Insensitivity to Evidence 
 Another possible explanation of moral disagreement is that it’s caused by faulty 
reasoning, or by a failure to take into account or properly weigh the relevant evidence.  
Some writers have claimed that the failure of imagination is a particularly pernicious 
problem in moral discourse—many disagreements are thereby supposed to be caused by a 
failure “to sympathize and imagine what it is like to occupy a different position in the 
relevant interaction,” (Enoch 2009: 25) or to imagine other people’s feelings.  Others 
(e.g. Shafer Landau 1994: 331) have suggested that emotions may “stand as a barrier to 
convergence” by interfering with our exercise of rationality.  But, as Brandt points out, 
emotion itself is not sufficient evidence of irrationality: for that, we need a “reason to 
believe that [the agent’s] desireless opinion is more correct than the one we regard as the 
creation of his desire” (1944: 489).  We need grounds beyond the dissenting judgment 
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itself for thinking that the disputant is irrational.  Furthermore, this explanation is less 
plausible as an explanation of inter-cultural disagreement: it’s one thing to claim a person 
is being irrational, but to accuse an entire culture of being irrational or unduly influenced 
by emotion is another matter entirely, a much stronger claim.   
 
2.3 Partiality   
 Yet other realists have appealed to the fact that we so often have a personal stake 
in the outcome of the dispute.  Enoch thinks this kind of explanation is “especially 
important” because “it is extremely powerful” and it can “explain the difference in the 
scope of disagreement in morality and in other discourses” (2009: 26), since the parties to 
a moral disagreement are more likely to have some interest in the outcome than the 
parties to a mathematical disagreement.  Boyd points out that morality is subject to a high 
degree of “social distortion,” and people’s judgments are often influenced by “class 
interests,” (1988: 212) two facts that he thinks explain much of the moral disagreement 
we observe.  Proponents of this explanation do not address the question of how exactly 
these factors distort; presumably, they lead people to cling to views even though, in the 
absence of a personal stake, they’d concede the argument.  And they do so by rendering 
the person blind to some piece of evidence, some intuition, some error in reasoning that 
they would be able to appreciate were they not personally invested in the outcome.   
I’m not as taken with this explanation as some of its proponents, not just because 
I’m skeptical of its explanatory power (though I am) but because demonstrating that self-
interest is implicated in a belief’s genesis doesn’t itself undermine the belief.  To do that, 
we’d want a more detailed explanation of how self-interest inclines us to error.  In many 
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cases, self-interest will make us more careful reasoners—if we have a stake in the 
outcome, we want to make sure to get it right.  If I am choosing between medical 
treatments for myself or a loved one, for example, I will presumably be motivated to 
learn as much as possible about my options.  So the idea that partiality on its own 
explains a moral disagreement is neither here nor there in terms of assigning fault to one 
of the disputants.  If this is to be an explanation, we need evidence that partiality makes 
people irrational in a manner that is likely to affect their moral judgment and reasoning.   
  
2.4 Background Theory 
 The disputants may come to the table not just with different factual beliefs, but 
with different background theories, and this is especially likely to be true in cases of 
cross-cultural disagreement.  If the disagreement can be explained in terms of these 
theories, then perhaps they aren’t really moral disagreements after all.  Daniels (1979: 
274) calls the state in which one’s background theories, principles, and intuitions about 
cases all align ‘wide reflective equilibrium,’ and suggests that “One traditional worry, 
that moral judgments are not objective because there is insufficient agreement about 
them, may be laid to rest by seeking wide reflective equilibrium,” in part because “It may 
allow us to reduce moral disagreements (about principles or judgments) to more resoluble 
disagreements in the relevant background… theories.”   
  Daniels is right that background theory is likely to be implicated in some/many 
moral disagreements, but overly optimistic in thinking that tracing moral disagreement to 
this level will make it more tractable, or lead to a quicker resolution.  That’s partly 
because disagreements over things like the correct theory of the person, or “the role of 
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morality in society” are still normative, and we are likely to find that our disagreements 
go ‘all the way down,’ as it were—for example, there may be no factual discovery that 
settles whether to think of a person primarily in terms of their relationships and 
responsibilities or their individual attributes and behavior.  This distinction corresponds 
roughly to what Nisbett (2003, see especially Ch. 3) describes as the difference between 
the Western, ‘individualist’ conception of the person and the Eastern ‘interdependent’ 
conception.  This is plausibly construed as a debate over background theory, and it likely 
exerts some influence over people’s judgments of obligation and permission, but it is a 
normative debate nonetheless.  Charles Larmore (1987: 57-58) puts the dilemma well:  
If we imagine that under ideal conditions others continue to hold their own view 
of the world, and that their view is significantly different from our own (imagine 
them to be Bororo, or Tutenkhamen and Li Po), we cannot expect that they could 
come to agree with us about the justification of some substantial claims of ours.  
And if… we imagine the supposedly ideal conditions as detached from our 
general view of the world as well as from theirs, we have no good notion of what 
would take place, if anything, and it is certainly unclear what sense there would 
be to saying that it is with the Bororo that we would be conversing. 
 
So while this is a plausible explanation of some disagreement, it’s not a defusing 
explanation; it fails to show that the disagreement is the result of an epistemic failure or 
defect on the part of one of the disputants.  Locating a moral disagreement in a 
disagreement about background theory doesn’t show that it’s not fundamental.   
The fact that moral disagreements might be due to these defusing explanations 
doesn’t show that they are.  The debate over the existence of fundamental moral 
disagreement has too often been conducted in terms of hypotheticals.  Instead, I will now 
survey some cases of actual moral disagreement, and see how well they are accounted for 




3. Disagreements Defused? 
3.1 Honor 
Nisbett and Cohen (1996; see also Sommers, 2009 for a discussion of honor 
cultures) coined the term ‘Honor Culture’ to describe cultures with the following 
features:  
§ There is little cooperation among strangers, rather, cooperation usually 
occurs between members of tight-knit groups or among kin; 
§ Protection of resources is critical for survival, and resources are relatively 
scarce; 
§ Attempts at theft or raids on property are common; 
§ The society is relatively lawless. 
 
The above characteristics are commonly found in herding societies, where one’s livestock 
is one’s livelihood, but where property (i.e. one’s herd) is relatively vulnerable to theft.  
Honor cultures are prominent in Mediterranean Europe, the Middle East, and the 
American South, but also to gangs and tribal societies.  According to Nisbett and Cohen 
(1996), in such cultures one’s reputation plays an important role in securing one’s 
resources and deterring attempts at theft.  Thus, in honor cultures, having a reputation as 
someone who violently responds to transgressions or attempted transgressions will be 
valuable, since it will deter others from attempting to take one’s property.  This leads to 
the prediction that members of honor cultures will be more likely to respond severely and 
violently to offenses and to insults that might threaten one’s reputation.  And in several 
studies, this is just what Nisbett and Cohen found. 
 Nisbett and Cohen predicted that, since the Southern United States was originally 
settled by cattle herders, honor culture norms would still prevail in the American South, 
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despite the fact that most Southerners no longer herd livestock.  Thus they hypothesized 
that Southerners would be more likely to respond violently to insults and would also be 
more tolerant of others’ violent responses to insult.  To test this hypothesis, they 
performed both laboratory and field studies.  In the first case, subjects hailing from both 
the Northern and Southern U.S. were brought into a laboratory (supposedly to perform an 
unrelated task) at which point their levels of cortisol (a hormone associated with stress) 
were tested.  Subjects were subsequently instructed to go to a different room.  While 
walking down the hallway, an experimental confederate bumped into the subjects and 
muttered ‘asshole’.  Cortisol levels were then re-tested.  Nisbett and Cohen discovered 
that Southern subjects showed greater levels of cortisol increase than their Northern 
counterparts.  In other words, Southerners had a stronger physiological response to insult 
than Northerners.   
In the field study, Nisbett and Cohen composed a letter purporting to be from a 
man who had recently been released from prison after serving a sentence for 
manslaughter and was seeking employment.  In the letter, the man explained that he had 
been in a bar when another man insulted his fiancée, to which he responded by 
suggesting that they step outside, at which point things escalated.  The letter was sent to 
potential employers in both the Northern and Southern U.S., and the differences in 
response were striking.  Southern employers tended to be far more sympathetic, with one 
responding: “anyone could have been in the situation you are in”.  No Northern responses 
were comparably sympathetic.  The case illustrates Sommers’ (2009: 37) observation that 
“honor cultures and non-honor cultures have radically different perspectives regarding 
responsibility and punishment.”  But does this represent a fundamental disagreement?  In 
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this case, it doesn’t look as though there are any differences in subjects’ understanding of 
the relevant non-moral facts.  Nor are the subjects obviously irrational in any way.  And 
in the field study at least, the potential employers had ample time to think about the case 
before responding to the letter.  So there’s no reason to think that their judgments were 
unduly rushed or caused by a lack of deliberation.  
  
3.2 Sex and Sexuality 
The question of with whom one is permitted to have sexual relations, and under what 
circumstances, is highly culturally variable.  Contemporary Western societies treat one’s 
sexual orientation as relatively fixed throughout one’s life.  Homosexuality has, until 
recently, been viewed with moral disapprobation, and sex with children and family 
members is strictly proscribed.  In contrast, the Ancient Greeks “regarded homosexual 
desire by a man or youth for a boy, or by a man for a youth, as natural.”  Sexuality was 
fluid, and identifying oneself as exclusively homo- or heterosexual was uncommon 
enough that, Dover reports, “An Athenian who said, ‘I am in love’ would not have taken 
it amiss if asked, ‘With a boy or a woman?’.”  (1994: 213)  The Greeks “would certainly 
not have regarded [an adolescent boy’s] homosexual activity in adolescence as 
incompatible with the enjoyment of women or with his eventual prospect of a 
harmonious marriage.”   
While the practice of sexual relations between boys and adult men may seem 
completely foreign to a contemporary American, the norms governing the practice are 
not: “Public attitudes to the lover and his boy in fourth-century Athens seem to have been 
remarkably similar to modern attitudes to pre-marital sexual relationships.” (Dover 1994: 
 
 56 
215)  The Greeks did not have markedly different factual beliefs about children or 
youths, and they were cognizant of, and had norms in place to protect against, the 
potential for physical harm caused by sexual relations between men and boys.  Consent 
was emphasized— boys were actively courted, but were free to assent to or reject the 
advances of an older suitor, and there is evidence that sex with boys deemed too young to 
grant consent was condemned.  Anal penetration was rare, and the preferred form of sex 
was intercrural (where the man’s penis is rubbed between the boy’s thighs), which may 
indicate concern for the well-being of the youth, and therefore signify that the Greeks 
were aware of the physiological facts surrounding sexual intercourse and its potential 
physical effects on a young boy’s body (for a discussion of the norms governing the 
Greeks’ practice of pederasty, see Nussbaum 1994).  It is likewise implausible to write 
off the Athens of Plato and Aristotle as an irrational culture, given that much of what we 
know about philosophical inquiry, we learned from the Greeks.  
The proscription of incest is one of the strongest candidates for a universal moral 
norm, in part because it is thought to have a biological basis: Evolutionary psychologists 
argue that humans have an innate aversion to sex with family members.20  This ‘incest-
avoidance mechanism’ (first proposed by Westermarck 1891) is thought to protect 
against the potentially deleterious effects of inbreeding/lack of genetic diversity.  
Different cultures differ on where, exactly, the boundaries of family versus potential 
mates are to be drawn: in some cultures, cousin marriage is not just permitted but 
encouraged, while in the contemporary United States, it is forbidden.  But evolutionary 
                                                
20 More recently, Shepher (1972) has refined the theory, arguing that the mechanism operates via 
imprinting, resulting in sexual avoidance of individuals who were cosocialized during a certain 
developmental window.   
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psychologists and anthropologists have tended to assume that all cultures proscribe 
sexual relations between siblings and between parents and their children.  However, it is 
now established that the Egyptians practiced what is known as “Royal Incest,” wherein 
siblings of royal families married one another.  More recently, some scholars have 
uncovered evidence suggesting that the practice extended beyond royal families; the 
classicist Walter Scheidel (1996: 322), “about one-third of all young men with 
marriageable sisters married them instead of women from outside the nuclear family.”  
Zoroastrian religious texts make frequent and approving reference to “next-of-kin 
marriage”; Scheidel quotes from one such text that appears to extol the virtues of parent-
child procreation: “blessed is he who has a child of his child…” (1996: 326).21  Goody 
(1956: 292) reports that the Tallensi of northern Ghana lack a word for incest, and that 
“offences [i.e. sexual relations] between brother and sister are merely ‘disreputable’,” but 
that the Ashanti, who live in central Ghana, treat sibling incest as an offense punishable 
by death.   
While it is plausible to claim that the permissibility of royal incest derives from 
beliefs about the special status of royals, who were thought to be more than human, and 
therefore not subject to the same standards as others, the prevalence of the practice 
among non-royals is not explained by these factual beliefs.  Nor, again, does irrationality 
seem like a plausible explanation: why should we suppose the Ashanti are more rational 
than their neighbors to the north?   
 
 
                                                
21 Sextus Empiricus reports, in the Outlines of Pyrrhonism, that “the Persians… marry their mothers; and 




In an ambitious and wide-ranging field study, Henrich et al (2005) performed 
ultimatum games in 15 small-scale societies.  Their results are especially interesting, 
because while earlier results of studies performed using university students as subjects 
revealed little cross-cultural variation in which offers were considered acceptable, 
Henrich et al’s experiments, which were performed in small-scale societies, revealed 
substantial variation between groups.   Whereas among university students playing an 
ultimatum game, “UG offers are consistently 50%”; among subjects in small-scale 
societies, offers ranged from well below 50% to up to 72%.  Likewise, rejection rates 
were also highly variable.  This may be an instance of a disagreement about ‘background 
theory,’ and while there may be agreement on the importance of fairness as such, there is 
little substantive agreement across these different groups on what constitutes a fair offer.  
It’s difficult to see what factual disagreement could be driving the differing offers in 
these games, which are after all fairly simple to explain and understand; there is likewise 
no reason for thinking that some of the groups studied were irrational in any relevant 
way.  So I agree with Machery et al’s (2005: 831) conclusion that “subjects distribute 
windfall gains differently because they hold different views about fairness, specifically 
about how to fairly distribute such windfall gains.”  And these differences may emerge 
fairly early in development: Rochat et al (2009) observed cross-cultural differences in 
performance on tasks involving fairness and distribution among children as young as five 
years old, with children in modern urban communities behaving more self-interestedly 




4. The A Posteriori Arguments 
 The realist’s defusing explanations have failed to satisfactorily account for the 
above cases (or have turned out not to be defusing to begin with), so we are now in a 
position to return to the a priori arguments above, and to premise two.  And we can now 
point to the existence of fundamental moral disagreement as evidence for the possibility 
of faultless moral disagreement.  In other words, we’ve arrived at the basis for an 
abductive argument for premise two of both the epistemic and the metaphysical a priori 
arguments: the existence of fundamental moral disagreement is best explained by the 
hypothesis that these are faultless moral disagreements, and that therefore there are no 
moral facts (via the metaphysical argument) and/or we do not have moral knowledge (via 
the epistemic argument).   
But the realist has another response up his sleeve.  The appeal to defusing 
explanations was intended to show that the putatively faultless disagreements that the a 
priori arguments appeal to are not really moral disagreements (because they turn on an 
issue of non-moral fact, or because they’re really just failures of rationality).  Another 
strategy the realist can take in response is to argue that they’re not really moral 
disagreements.  That is, the realist can refuse to grant the possibility of faultless 
disagreement by denying that faultless moral disagreement is conceptually coherent and 
insisting that if such a case is found, it’s not really a disagreement.  Disagreement, on this 
account, requires that one party be asserting a proposition and one party denying that 
same proposition (or asserting its negation).  And in such cases, mutual correctness is just 
not possible.  Hence on any plausible definition of disagreement, faultless disagreement 
is an incoherent notion.   
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The question of how best to define disagreement is vexed, and one I won’t settle 
here.  The antirealist is within her rights to resist this objection, and maintain that the 
realist’s response begs the question against the argument from disagreement, by ruling 
out the possibility of faultless disagreement as a matter of definition.  And she could 
point to the fact that many of the moral disagreements in question bear all the hallmarks 
of uncontroversially ‘genuine’ disagreements (such as, for example, disagreements about 
the correct way to divide a dinner check).  But many antirealists themselves are 
sympathetic to the aforementioned definition of (or constraint on a definition of) 
disagreement.  I do not want to enter into the debate over the correct account of what it is 
to be a disagreement here.  Nor do I need to, since the argument can be reformulated so 
as not to require or even mention ‘disagreement’.  The two arguments I discuss below— 
the a posteriori arguments from disagreement— do not turn on the possibility of faultless 
disagreement, but rather on the nature of actual moral disagreement.  And they do not 
turn on our definition of disagreement— in fact, while I will continue to use the word 
‘disagreement’ for continuity’s sake, the arguments I give below would lose none of their 
force if ‘disagreement’ were replaced with the more neutral term ‘diversity’.  The move 
from a priori to a posteriori arguments from disagreement allows the antirealist to 
sidestep the question of how to define disagreement.  I now discuss two a posteriori 
arguments from disagreement, one epistemic and one metaphysical.  I’ll argue that 
responding to these arguments creates a dilemma, in that the realist’s response to the 
metaphysical argument leaves him vulnerable to the epistemic argument.   
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 Specifically, I’m suggesting that the antirealist draw on the empirical evidence 
described above to bypass the a priori argument entirely and make an inference to the 
best explanation argument: 
1. The anti-realist can explain moral disagreement without appealing to objective 
moral facts or properties, by showing that our different moral views reflect 
different “ways of life”22 rather than (flawed, inaccurate, or distorted) perceptions 
of objective facts or properties. 
2. The realist explanation must not only appeal to moral facts or properties but also 
explain how we fail to recognize or be guided by them; he must explain moral 
disagreement as the result of error.23 
3. The anti-realist explains disagreement better than the realist, therefore; 
4. Most likely, there are no objective moral properties or facts. 
 
Since this is an inference to the best explanation argument, its success hinges on whether 
its proponent’s preferred explanation really does account for disagreement better than its 
realist competitor.  We’ve already seen that the realist’s proposed defusing explanations 
appear unable to account for the disagreements discussed above.   Mackie thinks the best 
explanation of disagreement is that our values and moral judgments are really 
conventional, inculcated by society.  So it’s not surprising that we see different 
judgments in different cultures.   
 The realist might protest at this point that his proposed explanation has been given 
short shrift.  Just because we have failed to identify the mistake, irrationality, or other 
defect responsible for the disagreement, he might argue, doesn’t mean it’s not there.  
                                                
22 I borrow this phrase from Mackie (1977: 37-38) 
23 This is a bit too strong.  The realist can appeal to indeterminacy and vagueness to explain some cases of 
moral disagreement— for example, it may be that some of the moral disagreements over the permissibility 
of abortion, or euthanasia, stem from vagueness or indeterminacy about personhood, or the fact that these 
are borderline cases of life.  This explanation must be used sparingly, though, since a morality that allowed 
lots of vagueness and indeterminacy would be unsatisfying and would fail to deliver on its promise of 
epistemic access to moral facts, and since many of the disagreements discussed in this chapter are not 
plausibly ascribed to these factors (for example, the question of whether or not it is permissible to sleep 
with family members is not, one suspects, due to an indeterminate concept of siblinghood). 
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After all, this is difficult stuff: many realists have proposed a sort of fifth defusing 
explanation, which boils down to: morality is hard.  With this consideration in mind, the 
realist may want to deny that he has failed to explain the disagreements; he can maintain 
that the defusing explanations are still the best explanation of the disagreement, even if 
we are not yet in a position to show where, exactly, the defusing explanations apply.  But 
the problem with this strategy is that it makes morality too hard, and therefore exposes 
the realist to yet another version of the argument from disagreement—a skeptical 
challenge: 
1. The process by which we form moral beliefs is unreliable (either because it is 
riddled with error, as the realist alleges, or because its aim and/or design is not to 
track truth or any real property of things, as the anti-realist alleges) 
2. Beliefs formed as a result of unreliable processes are unjustified. 
3. Our moral beliefs are unjustified. 
 
This skeptical argument follows from the responses from the inference to the best 
explanation discussed above, though it aims not at the moral facts themselves, but at our 
ability to form justified beliefs or make justified claims about them.  The IBE argument 
introduces two competing explanations of moral disagreement, and the skeptical (or 
epistemic) argument contends that on either explanation, our confidence in the processes 
by which we form moral beliefs should be undermined.  If the antirealist’s explanation of 
moral disagreement is correct, then our moral judgments are the product of convention 
and of our “participation in… ways of life.” (Mackie 1977: 37)  And this explanation 
renders moral facts explanatorily gratuitous, since it explains why we have the moral 
beliefs that we do without any mention of moral facts or truth.  In doing so, it also 
introduces a story about moral belief formation that does not paint the process as one 
aimed at tracking truth.  Rather, the process is one of socialization into, and conformity 
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to, ways of life and social convention. The argument here is not so different from 
skeptical arguments based on evolution (see, e.g., Kahane 2011, Joyce 2007, and Street 
2006, among others), except that it takes culture, rather than evolution, to be the relevant 
explanans.   
 This is partly because an evolutionary explanation would seem to favor a cross-
cultural uniformity of moral views.  Guy Kahane (2011: 121) points out that the 
phenomenon of moral diversity precludes explanation in terms of  “the diversity of 
evaluative beliefs over time and across and within cultures— a diversity not fully 
explained by differences in non-evaluative belief— makes the suggestion that all 
evaluative beliefs can be given a straightforward evolutionary explanation extremely 
implausible.”  The psychologist Solomon Asch argues that this implication may be so 
implausible as to actually provide evidence against relativism.  The relativist explanation 
of moral diversity in terms of culture presupposes, according to Asch, an implausibly 
plastic view of human psychology and motivation, one on which man is “a dynamically 
empty organism,” and on which “human nature is like water, which takes on whatever 
shape is imparted to it.” (Asch, quoted in Brandt 1944: 479)  But cultural explanations of 
morality needn’t deny that our moral psychology is shaped in part by evolution, nor need 
the existence of diversity preclude an evolutionary story about the nature and 
development of the cognitive architecture underlying moral judgment.  (Asch suggests 
that we view cultural differences as “the necessary consequence of permanent human 
tendencies coming to expression under particular conditions,” suggesting that he agrees 
with this assessment while disagreeing that it is compatible with relativism.)  So the two 
arguments are not incompatible; we can give an explanation of moral norms and beliefs 
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in terms of culture, evolution, or both.  The important thing is that whichever feature we 
invoke can explain our moral judgments without invoking moral facts.  Richard Joyce 
succinctly explains the debunking strategy: “I contend that on no epistemological theory 
worth its salt should the justificatory status of a belief remain unaffected by the discovery 
of an empirically supported theory that provides a complete explanation of why we have 
that belief while nowhere presupposing its truth.” (Joyce 2006: 219) 
On the other hand, if the realist’s explanation of disagreement is correct, then our 
moral reasoning and the resultant judgments are subject to distortion by irrationality, self-
interest, and ignorance.  Furthermore, if the realist is right, these influences operate so 
subtly that we’re often unaware of their influence, hence the persistence and intractability 
of moral disagreement—we stick to our guns because we fail to recognize that defusing 
explanations apply to us.  This combination of pervasiveness and subtlety is a recipe for 
skepticism: our belief forming mechanism, in the case of morality, is often thrown off-
track, and we are often unaware of this fact.   This means both that the process by which 
we arrive at moral beliefs/judgments is unreliable, and that for any particular belief, there 
is a non-negligible chance that the belief is the result of error, ignorance, and/or 
irrationality.  Therefore, if defusing explanations give the best account of moral 
disagreement, so much the worse for our confidence in our ability to form moral 







5. Objections and Replies 
 5.1 Overgeneralization/Companions in Guilt 
 Any argument that derives an antirealist conclusion from the existence of 
disagreement faces a companions in guilt response: the objection that most if not all 
discourses have areas of persistent, apparently faultless disagreement, and yet we are not 
thereby inclined to abandon realism about them.24  Earlier I mentioned mathematics, and 
there are many mathematical conjectures the truth of which remain contentious and 
which may never be proven true or false.  Brink points to scientific disagreements that 
once seemed interminable: “no one concluded from the apparently interminable 
disagreement among astronomers a short while ago about the existence of black holes 
that there was no fact of the matter concerning the existence of black holes.” (1989: 198) 
The debate over whether God exists, for example, is an instance of disagreement in which 
both parties are rational, privy to all the relevant facts, and seem to be epistemically 
faultless.  And it isn’t just that the disagreement is unresolved— it’s that it’s 
unresolvable.  It is highly unlikely that evidence could be procured which would satisfy 
both sides that the issue is settled.  Indeed, one of the reasons the debate remains so 
thorny is that there seems to be a lack of consensus on what form such evidence would 
have to take.  Nonetheless, we remain confident that there is a fact of the matter about 
which side is correct in the debate over God’s existence.  If disagreement doesn’t 
undermine realism about this question, why think it undermines realism about moral 
discourse?   
                                                
24 Loeb (2003) points out that this strategy can also be coopted by the antirealist, who can point to the 




 In responding to this objection, it’s important first to distinguish between different 
levels of disagreement.  The proponent of the argument from moral disagreement is 
basing his claims on disagreement about the correct answers to first-order moral 
questions, such as whether euthanasia is morally permissible or whether incest is morally 
wrong.  He is not basing his claim on the existence of higher-order disagreement over 
whether there is a correct resolution to these first-order debates (though this is another 
sort of objection that can be leveled against the argument from disagreement, one which I 
discuss below).  So the analogy with the debate over God’s existence is misguided: in 
neither case does the anti-realist want to deny that the ontological question has a uniquely 
correct answer.  The more apt analogy would be with debates over what attributes God 
has, and these do exist and have been taken as evidence that God does not exist.  
Likewise, fundamental disagreements over what properties different actions have (i.e. 
rightness, wrongness, permissibility) are, or so I’ve argued, good evidence that those 
properties don’t exist.25   
 But the realist can point to other debates as well, in areas such as mathematics, 
medicine, history, and science that aren’t about ontology, and reiterate the objection.  
And it’s here that the antecedent plausibility of realism becomes relevant.  We approach 
debates in math, medicine, and science with a presumption in favor of realism;26 to that 
                                                
25 For a discussion of religious disagreement and its significance, see Feldman (2007), who gives a 
thorough explication of the issues, but draws slightly different conclusions from the ones I’ve drawn here. 
26 The question of whether realism and anti-realism are best understood the same way across all these areas 
is potentially tendentious; in referring to mathematical realism, I certainly don’t mean to commit to a 
Platonist ontology or anything like that.  By ‘realism’ I mean the view that there are objective facts about 
these discourses; what undergirds those facts- the metaphysical nature of their ‘truthmakers’- is an issue on 
which I remain agnostic, though it is an interesting and worthy question to what extent and why realism can 
or should be consistently defined across different areas.  I discuss this briefly in Chapter 3. 
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extent, we suppose even apparently intractable debates in these areas will (or at least can) 
be resolved.  To the extent that they cannot, we should suspend realism about those 
questions.  (See Plakias and Doris 2008)  This is why the realist needs to motivate the 
idea that we approach the issue with a presumption in favor of realism in order for the 
objection to succeed.  Many of the considerations that motivate realist treatments of the 
other discourses under consideration are absent in the case of morality: moral facts don’t 
play the same explanatory role as scientific facts (Harman 1988), nor has there been the 
kind of progress in morality that has characterized math, science, and medicine (see 
Williams 1985, especially chapter 8; also Leiter 2009).  Realists have sometimes 
appealed to commonsense moral thought and practice to motivate the claim, arguing that 
we do in fact appeal to objective moral facts in our explanations, judgments, and 
justifications; this, combined with a preference for conservative/preservationist over 
revisionary theories, would create a presumption in favor of realism, and rehabilitate the 
analogy at issue.  The trouble is— as I argue at length in Chapter 3— the claim just isn’t 
true.  While we do talk about morality an awful lot, recent empirical work suggests that 
what we talk about when we talk about morality isn’t always (or even usually) objective 
(see Goodwin and Darley 2008, Nichols 2004, and Sarkissian et al in press).  So this 
appeal to folk morality also falls flat as a way of motivating a presumption in favor of 
moral realism, without which the companions-in-guilt strategy fails as a response to the 






5.2 The Argument is Self-Defeating   
A second, related objection to the argument from disagreement is that it’s self-defeating.  
This is like the overgeneralization objection, except here the complaint is more specific: 
the argument overgeneralizes to include itself in its scope, and therefore undermines its 
own claim.  If the existence of fundamental disagreement is a reason for skepticism or 
antirealism, then given the degree of disagreement over the argument from disagreement, 
we should be skeptics or antirealists about it.  In fact, the problem extends beyond the 
argument itself, and may encompass most if not all of philosophy.  Philosophical 
disagreements are especially troubling, because they have persisted for so long among 
reflective, informed, rational disputants.  Leiter (2009: 8) refers to “what seems to me the 
single most important and embarrassing fact about the history of moral theorizing by 
philosophers over the last two millennia: namely, that no rational consensus has been 
secured on any substantive, foundational proposition about morality,” but the observation 
extends beyond moral theory: a lack of consensus characterizes many if not most areas of 
philosophy.27  Enoch (2009: 47) notes, “disagreement is widespread not just in morality, 
but also about morality, in metaethics, and indeed in philosophy in general.”  For this 
reason, he thinks it will be difficult if not impossible to generate an argument from 
disagreement to the denial of realism that doesn’t defeat itself, either by defeating realism 
about metaethical theorizing— a kind of meta-metaethical realism— or by defeating 
realism about philosophical debates altogether.   
One response might be to embrace a kind of Pyrrhonian skepticism, either about 
moral theorizing or about philosophical theorizing more generally (for a discussion of 
                                                
27 See also Shafer-Landau (2003: 219-220). 
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Pyrrhonism about metaethics, see Sinnott-Armstrong 2009).  However, there are other 
responses available that require us to do less bullet-biting.  First, there is the question of 
how closely philosophical disagreements really do resemble fundamental moral 
disagreements.  A striking dissimilarity is that philosophers typically have a lot invested 
in the views they defend, and in their continued participation in philosophical debates: it 
is, after all, their job.  So defusing explanations may be more plausibly applied to 
disagreements between philosophers than to those between laypeople.  This is, of course, 
an issue that merits consideration on a case-by-case basis, which is beyond the scope of 
this paper.  But experimental philosophers have begun investigating whether there are 
correlations between certain personality traits and philosophical views; Nichols (2007) 
has argued that the rise of compatibilism can be explained in terms of the fact that 
compatibilism is motivationally attractive: to put it bluntly, the persistent popularity of 
compatibilism is an instance of wishful thinking.  If this line of argument is correct, then 
fundamental philosophical disagreement may be less pervasive than it appears to be.  
 At this point, the concern might shift from realism about philosophy to skepticism 
about philosophical arguments and reasoning, but this is a somewhat different claim than 
the claim that the argument from disagreement leads to antirealism about philosophy 
itself.  Furthermore, the question will have to be decided on a case-by-case basis, by 
looking at specific philosophical disagreements: it may well be that defusing explanations 
are more plausibly applied to (for example) debates in free will than to debates in 
ontology.  This is an empirical question and should be dealt with as such.  But notice that 
at this point, the argument no longer threatens philosophy as a whole, but rather different 
subfields or even particular debates within philosophy, which makes this a slightly more 
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palatable bullet to bite.  And skepticism about metaethics, even if it does extend to the 
argument from disagreement, might be a satisfactory enough conclusion for the 
irrealist/proponent of the argument from disagreement; if moral disagreement forces the 
suspension of judgment regarding competing metaethical theories, this might not be a 
victory for antirealism, but it is certainly a strike against moral realism.  Pyrrhonian 
skepticism is, in this case at least, not a Pyrrhic victory.   
 
Conclusion 
The observation that arguments from moral disagreement benefit from empirical research 
is not new; as the epigraphs to this paper reveal, the Greeks were acutely aware of the 
variation in moral codes and the possibility that claims about the universality of moral 
beliefs or practices are always vulnerable to new discoveries.  Nor has the empirical 
record been supplanted by newer, a priori forms of the argument from disagreement— as 
I’ve argued above, the existence of moral disagreement continues to make trouble for the 
realist’s assertions that moral facts exist and that we can claim to know them.  Realists 
such as Smith and Jackson predict that continued inquiry and argument will yield 
increased convergence, but this is an empirical prediction, and it’s worth noting that just 
as the significance of disagreement depends on its causes, so does the significance of 
convergence.  Furthermore, discoveries about the nature of the cognitive processes 
underlying moral judgment may lead us to revise our conception of what constitutes a 
defusing explanation.  Therefore, a metaethical theory that does not stand or fall with 
convergence is preferable to one that does.  Finally, we should expect and be prepared for 




disagreement; a theory that can accommodate both types of moral fact will therefore 
enjoy an advantage over a theory (such as Smith’s) that rules out this possibility a priori 













Contrary to what error theorists and many moral realists have claimed, moral 
discourse is not committed to full objectivity. 28   In fact, thinking of objectivity in terms 
of degrees can make sense of and reconcile apparently inconsistent features of moral 
discourse and judgment.  In this paper I describe and discuss evidence showing that 
morality can be vindicated, and can be said to have a subject matter, even if it lacks full 
objectivity.  I then discuss an objection to the effect that any morality that contains both 
objective and non-objective facts is inconsistent, incoherent or cannot be captured by a 
single metaethical analysis, a claim I dismiss by showing how moral relativism can 
account for the existence of both types of facts.  In other words, relativism makes sense 
of why some moral judgments seem to be more objective than others.  In the previous 
chapter I described evidence that this is in fact the case; in this chapter I focus on the 
                                                
28 Michael Smith holds a view like this, on which moral facts are those which ideal agents would all 
converge on, and on which morality is committed to objectivity.  If there are no objective moral facts, then, 
for Smith, there are no moral facts.  See, e.g., The Moral Problem, esp pages 9 & 13.  Despite holding a 
very different metaethical view, error theorists like Mackie and Richard Joyce also endorse the conditional: 
see Joyce’s The Myth of Morality, especially chapter 2, and Mackie’s Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, 
especially pages 23 and 40. 
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claim that a metaethical theory that includes both objective and relative moral facts is 
theoretically viable and practically necessary. 
 
1.  The Objectivity Assumption 
Horgan and Timmons (2008: 270) suggest that definitions of moral objectivity fall into 
one of two categories: ontological or rationalist.  On the ontological conception of 
objectivity, moral properties and facts are “out there to be experienced” in a way 
analogous to “ordinary physical-object thought and discourse.”  This means that the 
moral properties are not “certain idiosyncratic facts about the psychology of the agent 
making the moral judgment.”  On rationalist conceptions of objectivity, “a realm of 
thought or discourse is objective… if there is a method of thinking or reasoning whose 
use would yield… convergence in belief about the subject matter in question.”  These 
two conceptions of objectivity aren’t mutually exclusive; rationalist objectivity is 
sometimes seen as evidence for ontological objectivity.29  But the rationalist conception 
is more modest insofar as it does not take a position on what kind of facts the 
convergence of belief is about.  In this paper, I follow the rationalist conception of 
objectivity, and take objectivity to be a matter of convergence in belief among rational, 
informed agents.  One argument in favor of the ontological conception is that it best 
captures our intuitive, pre-theoretical understanding of objectivity; an objection to the 
rationalist conception might be that it makes moral objectivity look significantly different 
from objectivity in other domains.  But both points overlook the considerations that make 
                                                
29 For example. Williams (1985: 136) takes science to be a paradigmatically objective discourse, and points 
to the fact that in science, not only is there convergence, but “the best explanation of the convergence 
involves the idea that the answer represents how things are.”  
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moral objectivity distinctive.  While it is natural- and, in the case of physical object talk, 
apt- to think of objectivity as a matter of facts being “out there” in the world, existing 
independently of us and any of our beliefs about them, this conception of objectivity is 
complicated when applied to morality by the fact that morality is, essentially, about 
persons and their relations to one another.  So while we can say that physical objects 
existed and would continue to exist without any people to perceive them, the same cannot 
be said for morality.  Thus, the fact that a conception of moral objectivity- specifically, 
the rationalist conception- is discontinuous with conceptions of objectivity in other 
domains is not a strike against it, but a point in its favor. 
Moral relativism is often supposed to be a significantly revisionary view: “Moral 
absolutist philosophers often portray relativism as an exotic skeptical doctrine delivered 
by some special philosophical theory, and they see (and portray) themselves as defenders 
of common sense against the bizarre…” (Dreier, 2006: 241).  For example, Michael 
Smith writes that common sense morality is committed to the idea that “moral questions 
have correct answers; [and] that the correct answers are made correct by objective moral 
facts” (Smith 1994: 9).  This supposition is not unique to realists; relativists themselves 
have tended to take a defensive posture, conceding that “relative morality may be less 
than common sense can hope for” and that relativism is “revisionary of common sense… 
at odds with common sense moral thinking” (Dreier, 2006: 241).  Darwall writes: 
“Ethical thought and feeling have ‘objective purport.’ From the inside, they apparently 
aspire to truth or correctness and presuppose that there is something of which they can be 
true or false… something objective and independent of the perceiver (e.g., some 
objective fact or an objective property of some substance)” (1998: 25, 239). 
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Call this idea—the idea that common-sense morality is committed to, or aspires 
to, objectivity-- the objectivity assumption. The objectivity assumption is typically paired 
with a second, less explicit, assumption: that metaethical theory is, to some degree or 
another, constrained by common sense moral theory.  This constraint might be so strong 
that we are forced to reject any theory that counts as revisionary of common sense, or it 
might simply mean that that common sense morality is one factor among many we must 
weigh when constructing a theory.  In what follows, I will assume a moderate reading of 
it, which says that all things being equal, we should prefer a theory that vindicates and 
accords with common sense moral intuition/theorizing/discourse over one that is 
revisionary.  Call this moderate position metaethical conservatism.     
The rise of experimental philosophy has led to suspicion about unsubstantiated 
claims about common sense belief or intuition.  In this case, that suspicion turns out to be 
warranted.  The objectivity assumption turns out to be dubious, at best. 
But this same evidence that undermines the objectivity assumption raises a new 
puzzle.  As I’ll demonstrate shortly, it turns out that moral judgments are not all equal 
with respect to objectivity.  The reason for doubting the objectivity assumption is that, in 
the experiments I will describe below, subjects- users of common sense morality- have 
evinced a willingness to treat a moral violation as both morally wrong and relatively true.  
Furthermore, the degree of objectivity or relativity they assign to moral violations varies 
depending on the nature of that particular violation.  This is puzzling: are people being 
inconsistent or incoherent?  Are they judging as moral realists at one moment and moral 
relativists the next?  I argue that a particular kind of moral relativism makes sense of this 
puzzle, explaining how and why moral judgments can vary with respect to objectivity.   
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1.1 A Puzzle About Intuitions 
In his 2004 paper, 'After Objectivity,’ Shaun Nichols set out to determine whether 
undergraduates are moral objectivists or subjectivists30.  He asked undergraduates to 
imagine a case in which two individuals are arguing over the permissibility of hitting 
people for fun.  Both insist that among all the people they know, such a behavior is 
considered okay. Nichols found that a significant percentage of respondents were inclined 
to agree with the statement "there is no fact of the matter about unqualified claims like 'it 
is ok to hit people just because you feel like it.’  Different cultures believe different 
things, and it is not absolutely true or false that it is ok to hit people just because you feel 
like it."  Moreover, these respondents did not differ significantly from their moral 
objectivist counterparts when it came to their ability to distinguish moral violations (for 
example, hitting) from conventional violations (for example, talking out of turn, or 
chewing gum in a classroom where there is a rule against doing so).  This study casts 
doubt on the objectivity assumption— moral judgments are being made even in the 
absence of a judgment of objectivity.  It does not, however, address the question of 
whether these judgments of objectivity vary depending on the question at hand.   
There are also problems with the design of the experiment itself.  First, the sample 
size is very small—about forty undergraduates total (interestingly the sample was 
composed almost entirely of females—and the extent to which these intuitions vary by 
gender is an underexplored area of experimental philosophy at this point).  And some 
people have raised concerns about the use of a subject pool composed entirely of 
                                                
30 This is Nichols’ terminology, so I’ve followed him in using it to describe his experiment.  However, he 
intends it to contrast with objectivity, so for present purposes, it works much the same way as the term 
‘relativity’.    
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undergraduates- are college students representative of the population as a whole?  
Second, the forced-choice design of the experiment may raise concerns—subjects were 
forced to either endorse the wrongness of hitting people or to deny that such wrongness 
was absolute.  But it seems that subjects might want to say both that hitting people is 
wrong, and deny that this wrongness is absolute.  And subjects may have read the 
wording of the third and final choice as ambiguous between denying that there is any fact 
of the matter at all about such claims, and maintaining that there are facts but denying 
that the facts are absolute.  In fact, perhaps even more subjects would have chosen the 
non-objectivist option had it been presented in a more perspicuous way. 
In a related series of experiments, the psychologists Geoffrey Goodwin and John 
Darley (2007) set out to see whether subjects would treat ethical statements as objective 
and how this might differ from the way they would treat statements of scientific fact, 
social convention and taste.  The experimenters gave subjects a range of statements in all 
three areas and asked them to rate their agreement with each statement, as well as to 
indicate whether they thought it was true, false, or an opinion or attitude.  In the second 
phase, subjects were told that another person strongly disagreed with them, and asked 
whether they thought one of the two parties must be mistaken, or whether it is possible 
that neither party is mistaken.  Their results showed that overall, people tended to treat 
ethical statements as more objective than statements of convention or taste, but less 
objective than statements of fact.  The more interesting result, however, was the degree of 
variation within the category of ethical statements: subjects tended to strongly agree with 
statements concerning the permissibility/wrongness of bank robbing or opening gunfire 
on a crowd, and were likely to judge these statements ‘true,’ but, while levels of 
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agreement with statements concerning the permissibility/wrongness of abortion, 
euthanasia and stem cell research were similar, subjects proved extremely reluctant to 
describe these as ‘true.’  For example, 68% of subjects said it was a true statement that 
it’s wrong to open fire on a crowd, but only 2% of subjects said it was a true statement 
that abortion is permissible.  This indicates that whether subjects regarded a statement as 
expressing an “opinion or attitude”31 or an objective fact is heavily influenced not just by 
the domain (aesthetic, ethical, scientific) but also by the specific content of the 
statement.   
Note that the two-phase methodology described above addresses the concern I 
raised about Nichols’ experiment—subjects were given the option to separately rate 
wrongness, whether they thought the statement described a fact or an opinion or attitude, 
and objectivity, thereby eliminating the ambiguity of Nichols’ results.  In addition, while 
the initial paper uses an undergraduate subject pool, subsequent studies (Goodwin and 
Darley, ms) replicate the result among both faculty and nonacademic adult subjects, 
ameliorating concerns that the result is just an artifact of relying on an undergraduate 
population.   
In another recent study, Hagop Sarkissian et al (in press) describe Horace, an 
agent who “finds his youngest child extremely unattractive and therefore kills him.”  
Subjects were then asked to consider two individuals judging Horace’s action, one of 
whom judges it morally wrong while the other judges it morally right.  One of the judges 
is described as a classmate of the subject; the second judge is described either as a typical 
                                                
31 For a discussion of why this experiment fails to distinguish between these two, and whether any 
experiment can distinguish attitude from opinion or belief, see the discussion in section 3.1 below. 
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American college student, a member of an Amazonian tribe with very different values, or 
as an extraterrestrial being with a very different psychology from human beings.  
Subjects are then asked to rate their agreement with the statement, “since [the two judges] 
have different judgments about this case, one of them must be wrong.”  What the authors 
found was that subjects’ relativism, as measured by their disagreement with this 
statement, increased as the distance/differences between the two judges increased.  One 
might argue that this is due to some kind of framing effect that subjects would repudiate 
were they made aware of it, but subjects who were given all three cases at once continued 
to respond as most relativist in the extra-terrestrial case, significantly less relativist in the 
Amazonian case, and as objectivists in the same-culture case.  This indicates that subjects 
are aware that they are treating the three cases differently and that they do not feel 
pressure to revise their judgments so as to respond the same way in each of the three 
cases.  It would seem that “People. . . reject the idea that a single absolute standard can be 
applied to all moral judgments of a given agent and to operate instead with a system that 
applies different standards to different judges” (Sarkissian et al, in press). 
 
1.2 Culture, Content or Both?   
The foregoing experiments suggest that the degree to which subjects are willing to 
say that a dispute has a single right answer is a factor of the similarity or dissimilarity 
between the disputants.  Subjects treat disputes between individuals within the same 
culture as having an objectively correct resolution, but objectivity decreases as the 
distance between disputants increases.  However, Sarkissian et al only tested extremely 
violent transgressions, involving harm to non-culpable bystanders.  Goodwin and 
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Darley’s results demonstrate that varying the type and nature of the transgression also 
affects judgments of objectivity.  This suggests that cultural distance is not the only 
dimension along which judgments of objectivity vary.  Rather, content also plays a role: 
in Goodwin and Darley’s study, the transgressions most likely to be judged objectively 
wrong involved violent harm to innocent bystanders.  It’s also worth noting that 
euthanasia and abortion, the two actions judged to be least objective, are extremely 
controversial.  This is suggestive: perhaps the folk are also operating with a rationalist 
conception of objectivity.   
 
2.  If the Objectivity Assumption is False, is any Metaethics Permitted? 
The experiments discussed above raise doubts about the objectivity assumption 
and introduce a further observation: that some moral claims are treated as more objective 
than others.  One objection to according these experimental results any significance is 
that they are plainly inconsistent or incoherent: that subjects treat some cases as objective 
and others as relative only shows that they lack a coherent concept of morality, and 
therefore their concepts should be disregarded.  Furthermore, if it is true that subjects lack 
a unified, coherent concept of morality, but are instead deploying two distinct or different 
concepts, then any account we give of moral judgment that treats it as homogeneous will 
be significantly revisionary.32  So not only should we not try to account for these 
                                                
32 This objection is similar to a line of argument put forth in MacIntyre, who writes that “the integral 
substance of morality has to a large degree been fragmented” (1981: 4).  See also his discussion of the 
emergence of emotivism as a competitor to objective moral theory, pp 15-20.  It is also echoed in 
Larmore’s discussion of the heterogeneity of morality (1987: ch 6).  However, the objection discussed here 
bears, not on the content of moral theories, but on their metaethical features.   
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judgments, we should view them as licensing accounts that depart significantly from 
common sense morality—because there is no coherent common sense morality.   
 Or perhaps we should view these judgments as a reason to give up on the project 
of vindicating moral discourse and instead adopt an error theory concerning morality.  
Don Loeb argues that variations in judgments about objectivity like the ones discussed 
above license a move to an error theory: “inconsistent elements—in particular, 
commitments both to and against objectivity—may be part of any accurate understanding 
of the central moral terms.” These conflicting commitments have metaethical 
consequences, since “if the moral vocabulary is best understood as semantically 
incoherent, the metaphysical implication is that with respect to that vocabulary there is 
nothing to be a realist about” (Loeb 2008: 358).  Call this view metaethical 
incoherentism.   
 If, however, we take seriously the idea that metaethics should, insofar as possible, 
capture the tacit commitments of ordinary moral discourse, then we should attempt to 
account for prima facie inconsistent intuitions.  This has led some to argue in favor of a 
more ecumenical view than incoherentism.  Metaethical variantism claims that "(a) some 
uses of moral language definitely fit expressivism, (b) other uses definitely fit realism, 
and (c) neither kind of use is primary or aberrant" (Sinnott-Armstrong 2009: 239.)  Note 
the starkness of this dichotomy:  there's plenty of interesting theoretical territory between 
realism and expressivism, but Sinnott-Armstrong's definition treats relativist, response-
dependence, constructivist, and subjectivist accounts as fly-over country.  Yet, as I’ll 
show in the next section, fly-over country is where we find the best of both worlds: an 
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account that reconciles and makes sense of our seemingly inconsistent metaethical 
commitments.   
 
2.1 How to be a Moral Relativist  
Apparently conflicting intuitions can be reconciled using a version of moral 
relativism sometimes called ‘self-locating’ relativism, first proposed and developed by 
Andy Egan (ms).  This type of moral relativism draws on the idea that truth can be 
assessed, not just at worlds, but at centered worlds. Whereas analyzing the truth of a 
proposition relative to a world only requires us to know which possible world we are 
looking at, or rather which possible world is accurate, analyzing its truth relative to a 
centered world requires us to look at the triple (w, t, i),  where ‘w’ picks out a world of 
evaluation, ‘t’ picks out a time, and ‘i’ picks out an individual.33   This version of 
relativism is called self-locating because it doesn’t just tell us what world we’re in, but 
where we are in that world.  So, for example, ‘Chicago is north of New Orleans’ is true in 
all the possible worlds where Chicago is north of New Orleans, but ‘New Orleans is 
nearby’ is true only when uttered by a speaker occupying a certain location within those 
worlds.34   The moral agent is, when uttering moral claims, attempting not just to describe 
the world, but to locate himself within it by self-ascribing some property.  For Egan, the 
property we are ascribing when we make moral claims is “being someone whose ideally 
rational self would desire that they φ.”  This is an amended version of Smith’s (1994) 
                                                
33 This idea goes back to Lewis (1979).  As far as I know, however, Egan is the first to apply it to ethical 
theory. 
34 The example is borrowed from Egan (2006) who emphasizes that the point about location is not to be 




view, which analyzes moral rightness in terms of the desires that ideally rational agents 
would have.  But whereas Smith requires convergence among ideally rational agents 
regarding those desires in order for morality to have a subject matter, Egan drops this 
requirement, so it’s guaranteed that morality has a subject matter whether or not 
convergence obtains. 
One might worry that on this account, what we are doing with moral language is, 
essentially, reporting on our desires.  And this doesn’t seem to be what moral discourse is 
concerned with.  Brandt, himself a relativist, is careful to note that “what anyone is 
definitely committing himself not to do, when he uses moral language, is to give 
expression to what he personally wants” (1950: 316).  The problem is illustrated by 
comparing a desire-based self-locating relativism with Michael Smith’s view, which 
identifies moral rightness with the desires that all ideal agents would converge upon.  
Since it can’t avail itself of the convergence requirement, though, this account leaves it 
unclear why anyone else should care about our moral claims, and how we can make 
moral demands on someone.  Smith has a story to tell here: if moral rightness is what the 
desires of all ideally rational agents would desire, and I tell you that φ is morally right, I 
am telling you something about your desires in ideal conditions.  But Egan can’t appeal 
to this story.  Another way of putting the problem is that, while Egan has a way of 
accounting for why and how my judgment that it would be wrong to φ gives me a reason 
not to φ, he has trouble accounting for why my judgment that it would be wrong to φ has 
any bearing whatsoever on whether you ought to φ.  Stevenson makes a similar point: 
“Note that the ethical sentence centres the hearer’s attention not on his interests, but on 
the objects of interest, and thereby facilitates suggestion” (1997: 78).  Stevenson draws 
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our attention to the fact that not only are moral sentences not purely egocentric, they 
attempt to influence the beliefs and behavior of others.  But why would a claim about my 
desires have any power to recommend an action to, or demand certain treatment from, 
others? 
Egan might respond to this objection by appealing to an account of assertions as 
an attempt to add propositions to the ‘conversational scoreboard’ or common ground of 
one’s interlocutors. This explains why we bother to make moral assertions at all: we are 
trying to get our interlocutor to self-attribute the same property we are self-attributing.  
Another way to put the point is that there is a presupposition of relevant similarity in 
play.  If I am trying to get you to self-attribute the property I’m ascribing to myself, it’s 
because I think we’re similar in both having the property.  This response can explain why 
we make moral assertions; it’s because we want to get the other person to self-attribute 
our desires.  And if we assume that both parties are aware of the presupposition of 
relevant similarity in play, we can explain how the act of assertion succeeds.  However, 
this response is fairly limited insofar as it still doesn’t answer the question of why we 
care to get others to self-attribute in this way, and how we are able to make moral claims 
across conversations.  It also seems unable to account for why we are motivated to punish 
wrongdoers, even if they have not wronged us but rather some third party. 
This objection can be solved by taking Egan up on his suggestion that “Anybody 
can build a self-locating theory at home: start with your favorite naturalistic theory… and 
just take the universal quantifier off the front” (ms: 6).  One way of amending the 
analysis to restore the social, reason-giving nature of morality is to substitute the attitudes 
of approval and disapproval in place of desire.  At first glance this might not seem like 
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any improvement at all: can’t we just run the same objection against ‘approval’?  The key 
to understanding why this is an improvement lies in a particular gloss on the attitudes of 
approval and disapproval, one discussed by Philipa Foot, who writes that “it is no more 
possible for a single individual to approve or disapprove than it is for him to vote” 
because “approval and disapproval can, logically speaking, exist only against a 
background of agreement about the part that other people’s views shall be given in 
decision making” (2003: 190, 199).  This point is echoed by Darwall’s discussion of the 
second-person standpoint; Darwall argues that in making moral claims upon others, we 
offer reasons whose validity depends on presupposed authority and accountability 
relations between persons.  “[B]eing subject to moral obligations includes accountability 
to those with the normative standing to demand compliance… morality as equal 
accountability understands the moral point of view to be fundamentally intersubjective” 
(Darwall 2006: 102-103).  Approval and disapproval capture this intersubjectivity, since 
“the attitudes of approval and disapproval would not be what they are without the 
existence of tacit agreement on the question of who listens to whom and about what” 
(Foot 2003: 198).  Approval and disapproval have an affective component, but also make 
reference to what we expect from others and what they can expect from us.  Sripada 
(2005: 779) suggests that “the most commonly used [and most effective at 
stabilizing/maintaining compliance with moral norms] kind of punishment in human 
societies is reputation-based punishment,” either via public denunciation or shaming, or 
by gossip and ostracism.  This kind of punishment can only be effective, however, when 
there is coordination on “a certain assumption about the determination of conduct in a 
certain area,” to borrow a phrase from Foot (2003: 203).    
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Substituting approval for desire, then, avoids the complaint that self-locating 
relativism is overly egocentric, while retaining the link that desire provided to motivation 
(via the affective component of approval). Rather than analyzing the claim ‘ϕ-ing is 
morally right’ as ‘ϕ-ing would be desired by any rational agent’ (as Smith does) or as ‘my 
(rational, informed) self desires ϕ-ing’ (as Egan does), I am proposing we analyze it as 
‘my (rational, informed) self approves of ϕ-ing’.  So when I judge that keeping promises 
is morally right, I am saying that I approve of keeping promises.  Rather than building the 
imperative force of my claim into the form of the analysis itself, this account builds it 
into the psychological state of approval.  This might seem to be just a special instance of, 
or variation on, desire; as Foot notes, “approving and disapproving are thought 
[incorrectly] to be rather like wanting and not wanting… the ill-defined term of art ‘pro-
attitude’ is used to slide between wanting and approving” (2003: 192).  But Foot points 
out that approval is essentially interpersonal in a way that wanting is not.  The attitudes of 
approval and disapproval presuppose “some kind of influence… those able to approve or 
disapprove are as a general rule taken account of or listened to” (2003: 198).  While 
approval is a pro-attitude, it is a special kind: it assumes “the existence of tacit agreement 
on who listens to whom and about what… where we have approval or disapproval we 
necessarily have such agreements, though it may not be necessary that we have just the 
agreements that we do.” (2001: 198)  One way to put the difference between the analysis 
I’m proposing here and Egan’s analysis is that whereas Egan analyzes moral claims in 
terms of desire, and then appeals to the presupposition of relevant similarity— as a 
general feature of all assertion— to explain why we assert moral claims to others, the 
analysis I’m offering builds that into the moral claim itself, by building it into the attitude 
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of approval.  The very possibility of the attitude, as Foot reminds us, depends on such a 
presupposition being in play.  Rather than a contingent feature of moral discourse, or a 
feature common to all discourse, this is an essential fact about the attitudes of approval or 
disapproval.  To reiterate a point made above, what makes moral approval and 
disapproval possible is “a shared assumption about the determination of conduct within a 
certain area.”  Thus this account can explain, not only why we make moral claims and 
want people to accept them, but also why this is such an essential feature of moral 
discourse.  When we accept someone’s claim of approval or disapproval, we are 
assenting to the assumption that we will listen to and consider that person’s views, 
claims, or wishes.  We are assenting to the idea that the person counts or is to be “taken 
account of,” as Foot puts it.   
The analysis proposed here is in many ways quite similar to that proposed by 
Stevenson, who also analyzes claims of moral rightness in terms of the attitude of 
approval, and is careful to distinguish this attitude from liking: “When a person likes 
something, he is pleased when it prospers and disappointed when it doesn’t.  When a 
person morally approves of something, he experiences a rich feeling of security when it 
prospers, and is indignant… when it doesn’t.”  But whereas Stevenson maintains that 
moral disagreement is always disagreement in interest, on this view it is, at least 
sometimes, also about “belief about interests.” (1997: 79)  It is about a belief about what 






2.2 How to be a Moral Relativist and a Moral Objectivist    
A few more clarifications are in order before we can begin to see how this kind of 
relativism provides a solution to the puzzle described above.  It is important to note that 
any possible worlds proposition can be transformed into a centered-worlds proposition by 
adding an index for an individual; in most cases, this will in no way affect the truth value 
that proposition gets assigned at a possible world.  Any possible worlds proposition that 
is true in the actual world simpliciter will be true at (actual, t, i) for any time t and 
individual i we plug in.  Call these 'boring centered worlds propositions'-- possible worlds 
propositions that can be analyzed as centered worlds proposition, but whose truth value is 
not altered by adopting either the former (coarse-grained) analysis or the latter, more 
finely-grained analysis.  
This may seem like a fairly trivial observation, but appreciating this point is a 
crucial first step towards seeing why this view is able to handle the puzzle discussed 
above without forcing us into either variantism or incoherence.  On a self-locating 
relativist view, we can accommodate the observation that some moral facts are objective 
and others are relative.  We can accommodate intuitions that disagreements about 
abortion or euthanasia are faultless, as well as the intuition that any reasonable person 
would agree that torturing babies is just wrong-- no matter the agent, or the 
circumstances.  And we can remain agnostic about the extent of moral relativism versus 
moral objectivity-- this account leaves the question of which moral judgments we will or 
would converge upon open and amenable to empirical investigation.35   (This is similar to 
Jackson’s (1998: 117) discussion of 'mature folk morality'-- on his view, whether there is 
                                                
35 See Chapter 2 for an argument to the effect that such convergence is not forthcoming. 
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an objective moral subject matter depends on the truths on which we would converge at 
something like 'the end of inquiry;’ if there is no such convergence, moral relativism is 
true.  But, one might respond, from our current standpoint, both outcomes are possible, so 
we ought not adopt a theory that rules out either possibility a priori.)  We can deny that 
objectivity is required for morality to have a subject matter, without precluding it or 
ruling it out a priori.  Indeed, as I will argue, with a few modifications, this kind of view 
can accommodate all of the data that motivate mixed or variantist metaethics while 
incurring none of the costs.   
Let me illustrate how.  Suppose that for some act φ, it's the case that everyone’s 
informed, rational self would approve of φ-ing.  Then it's the case that everyone would be 
correct to self-attribute the property, 'being someone whose ideally rational self approves 
of φ-ing.'  Now suppose A and B are arguing over whether it's right to φ, with A insisting 
it is and B insisting it isn't.  A is correctly self-attributing the property, B is mistakenly 
denying that he has the property; and so we have a case not just where two people are 
disagreeing and it just so happens that one is mistaken, but where if any two people 
disagree over whether φ is morally right, one of them must be mistaken.  So it looks like 
we have something that is behaving an awful lot like an objective moral fact; ‘φ-ing is 
morally right' is true, regardless of who says it.  In other words, it’s a boring centered-
worlds proposition.  Even those who have been impressed by the extent of moral 
diversity should be willing to grant the possibility that there are facts like this (and in the 
next chapter I will examine the evidence for thinking that, actually, there are claims like 
this); perhaps torturing babies for fun is something that, just by virtue of being human 
and having the kind of psychology we do, no one's ideally rational self would fail to 
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disapprove of.  So for some action φ, it's the case that everyone would be correct to self-
attribute approval of φ-- the truth-value of the proposition remains constant regardless of 
which agent we fill in the individual parameter with.  Therefore, if any two people 
disagree over whether φ-ing is right, one of them is mistaken.  To reiterate: this is starting 
to look a lot like moral objectivity.   
In other cases, the action we plug in for φ might be approved by some ideally 
rational agents and disapproved of by others.  Here, it's entirely possible to end up with 
cases of faultless disagreement, with one party correctly self-attributing a property and 
the other party denying they have that property.  Here we get variation in truth value, 
depending on which agent is plugged in to the individual parameter.  In the case of 
properties like this, we can have disagreements where one party is at fault-- perhaps they 
haven't thought fully about the issue, or there is some incoherence in their beliefs, or a 
factual error, etc-- but insofar as faultless disagreement is possible here, it looks like these 
are not objective moral facts/judgments.   
This account can handle the motivations for metaethical variantism nicely.  It 
accommodates the observation that we will be more objective about some moral 
violations than others.  And it gives a good explanation of why this is so: when it comes 
to some acts, the story might go, it doesn't matter where you start from, or who you are, 
or what other beliefs or desires you have-- the act is one that any rational person would 
disapprove of.   In any society, group, or culture in which people’s views are taken 
account of, the act will be disapproved.  And since shared social practice is a 
precondition for approval and disapproval, there just could not be a rational agent who 
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approved such an act.36  In other cases, we do think the contingencies of personal identity 
make a difference, and so we are more likely to treat those judgments as relative or 
nonobjective.  Candidates for the former kind of violation are cases involving grave and 
gratuitous harm and suffering; the latter types of violations concern sex, or purity, or 
respect.  We can also explain individual differences in judgments of objectivity in terms 
of differences between speakers in their beliefs/assumptions about similarity: speakers 
who are treating moral questions objectively are assuming a kind of similarity between 
all agents, whereas those who are more inclined to relativism are allowing that there may 
be a great deal of diversity, even once we have idealized the agents in question.37  
 
3. Objections and Replies 
3.1 Variantism, Redux 
We’ve seen how a self-locating relativism can reconcile our seemingly 
inconsistent intuitions about objectivity.  But recall that, according to Sinnott-
Armstrong’s definition, variantism is committed to the claim that “some uses of moral 
language definitely fit expressivism” (Sinnott-Armstrong 2009: 239).  And the relativist 
view described above cannot accommodate a commitment to both cognitivism and non-
cognitivism.  Is this a problem?  It might be, if there were empirical evidence suggesting 
that this claim were true.  But, unfortunately for variantism, the experiments discussed 
                                                
36 Though there could be an agent who had a pro-attitude towards the act.  But some acts are so outrageous 
that someone who was for them would be ‘out,’ as it were.  Foot notes that “the presumption that account 
[of someone’s views] will be taken is only a presumption, and may be destroyed,” and in such a case, the 
person really will not be able to approve the act, since he has forfeited claims to consideration by being for 
such an outrageous act.  Rationality, here, means that one is (or one’s judgment is) entitled to consideration 
and is prepared to grant such consideration to others (or to others’ judgments).   
37 See Chapter 2. 
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above fail to provide any evidence that there are, in fact, uses that definitely fit 
expressivism.  So while we have compelling empirical evidence for variation in intuitions 
about objectivity—that our discourse includes claims to and against objectivity—we have 
no evidence for the claim that moral discourse includes claims to and against cognitivism.  
Here’s why. 
Recall that in Goodwin and Darley’s experiments, the nonobjectivist answer was 
measured by whether the subjects rated the statement of the transgression as describing 
"an opinion or attitude."  However, the difference between an opinion and an attitude, 
while perhaps dispensable for purposes of measuring only objectivism, is crucial to 
detecting the difference between an expressivist and relativist view.  A response of 
"opinion or attitude" could indicate either that the statement in question is not a fact 
because different people might have equally justified, or equally true beliefs about it, or 
that it is not a fact because attitudes aren't the kinds of things that are true or false.  So 
this experiment provides no support for variantism as defined by Sinnot-Armstrong, 
though it does provide strong support for a weaker kind of variantism, a version akin to 
Loeb’s (2008) claim that our moral discourse includes commitments both to and against 
objectivity—an observation that, as we’ve seen, is explained on a self-locating relativist 
view. 
 Likewise, in Nichols’ experiments, giving a nonobjectivist answer is no indication 
of non-cognitivism.  If anything, it is support for a kind of relativism.  To wit: those who 
give the nonobjectivist answer are agreeing to a statement that emphasizes the 
'unqualified' nature of the claim and goes on to state that 'different 
cultures believe different things...it is not absolutely true that it is okay to hit people...' 
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(my emphasis).  Assent to this claim hardly looks like a ringing endorsement of non-
cognitivism.  Rather, it looks as though the nonobjectivist subjects are saying something 
like, 'well, it can be true for me and false for someone else, it depends on what you and 
yours believe,’ which looks a lot like a kind of relativist analysis.  The wording of both 
the objectivist and the nonobjectivist answers contains an implicit assumption-- or at least 
insinuation-- of the truth-aptness of moral claims, regardless of the kind of truth in 
question.  It implies that they are of a cognitive piece with beliefs.  So this experiment 
can’t possibly yield any evidence bearing on the cognitivism/noncognitivism debate.   
 
3.2 It’s Normative, but What Makes it Moral? 
 Another objection to the idea that metaethical analyses ought to or even can 
accommodate both relativist and objective moral facts runs as follows: If there are any 
moral facts at all, they are objective.  Therefore, the purported discovery that some moral 
claims are relative while others are objective is actually just the claim that there are fewer 
moral facts than we thought.  So what we’ve discovered is not that morality contains 
objective and non-objective commitments, but rather that some judgments we had taken 
to be moral are in fact non-moral normative judgments.38  The problem with this line of 
argument is that it makes objectivity too cheap—by making objectivity a defining feature 
of morality, it rules out a priori the possibility of discovering genuine moral diversity.  
Because once we discover that there is widespread disagreement over the moral 
permissibility of incest, or of corporal punishment, we have thereby discovered that the 
                                                
38 For a more detailed discussion of how to identify and distinguish moral judgments and norms, with 
attention to empirical and cross-cultural cases, see ch. 2, where I argue for the importance of identifying 
standards that are non-ethnocentric and are as ecumenical as possible.   
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issue is not a moral one at all!  And this is problematic insofar as it does not seem like 
moral disagreement is conceptually incoherent.  The strategy of argument outlined above 
gets objectivity on the cheap, but at the cost of denying the possibility of genuine moral 
diversity. 
The objection can be reiterated at the level of judgment.  If subjects are not 
judging an act objectively wrong, the thought goes, they are not judging it morally 
wrong.  Rather, they are saying it is forbidden according to some system of rules or 
another, but this is not the same as saying it is morally forbidden. 
One instance of this argument is represented in the literature on the 
‘moral/conventional distinction.’  This distinction is employed by philosophers (Nichols 
2004) and psychologists (see, e.g., Turiel 1983 and Nucci 2001) alike to demarcate the 
moral from the social domain.  According to this approach, moral norms are more serious 
than conventional norms, their scope is global, and they do not depend on rules or 
authority figures for their legitimacy—hitting would be wrong, for example, even if there 
were no rule against it.  Conventional violations are less serious; their scope is local, and 
they are authority-contingent (i.e., if the teacher had no rule against chewing gum in 
class, it would be okay to chew gum in class).  Subjects who do judge something wrong, 
but not globally wrong, the argument goes, are judging it conventionally, rather than 
morally wrong—even if their vocabulary is too confused to express this fact. 
 Promising though it might seem, the moral/conventional distinction is ultimately 
untenable unless supported by some other way of distinguishing moral from other 
normative violations.  To see why, consider disgusting norm violations.  Recall that on 
this account, what distinguishes moral from conventional violations is a signature 
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response pattern: moral violations are more serious, global and non-authority contingent.  
Now consider the following violation: at a dinner party, Mark spits in his water glass and 
then drinks from it.  When subjects are given a description of Mark’s behavior, they 
exhibit the response pattern characteristic of moral violations—they judge it as more 
wrong than non-disgusting etiquette violations, and they treat it as global in scope and not 
authority contingent (Mark can’t cancel out the wrongness by fiat).  So it looks like on 
the account we are considering, spitting in one’s glass and drinking from it is a moral 
violation.  But now things look a bit complicated.  For now we find ourselves forced to 
treat etiquette violations as moral violations.  If this seems odd to you—if you think, for 
example, that blowing one’s nose in a napkin and then using it to wipe one’s mouth is 
gross, sure, but not immoral—as it does to me, this shows that we are drawing on some 
antecedent distinction between the moral and the conventional.39  We distinguish bad 
manners from bad morals.  But the defender of the account under consideration here can’t 
appeal to any such distinction, since for him, the distinguishing feature just is the 
signature response pattern.  And yet philosophers who rely on the moral/conventional 
distinction typically do not tout the surprising discovery that the rule against spitting in a 
glass and then drinking from it is a moral rule; rather, they continue to talk about disgust-
backed etiquette norms (see, for example, Nichols 2002).  This suggests that they are 
relying on something other than the supposedly signature response pattern of moral 
judgments to distinguish moral and social rules, and therefore that judgments of 
objectivity are not an identifying characteristic of moral norms. 
                                                






Moral relativists have, in the past, conceded too much too quickly to moral realists.  
Relativism is not, in fact, a revisionary position.  Furthermore, relativism and moral 
objectivity can coexist peacefully.  Relativism leaves questions about the extent of moral 
disagreement and convergence open to empirical inquiry, as they should be; it explains 
the subject matter of moral discourse in a way that does not require an a priori 
commitment to full objectivity.  It allows for variation within moral discourse, with some 
claims being more objective than others.  And it does not preclude the possibility of 
either moral mistakes or moral criticism.  Some may complain that the type of account 
described here makes morality unacceptably anthropocentric: the kind of objectivity we 
end up with is, in the end, an objectivity that is contingent on the attitudes of actual moral 
agents.  This seems to me to be an asset rather than a cost, though this may, in the end, be 
a matter of temperament.  Nonetheless, I think the account described above exposes what 
is at issue in many if not all of these debates about objectivity: the extent to which the 
minimum requirements of rationality, combined with facts about human psychology, 
determine a unique set of moral norms.  As such, it is both naturalistically respectable 
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